From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's relations with the West

Abstract

NATO's view of Operation Allied Force (OAF)-that intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was necessary in order to put an end to massive human rights violations by Serb forces against the Albanian population of Kosovo and thus avoid a regional conflagration-was not one shared in Russia. There, OAF excited a fervent debate that went to the heart of post-Cold War European security governance and still resonates today. Its impact on the thinking of Russia's political elite-even now, perhaps, not fully appreciated by NATO and western policy-makers-was best summed up by a moderate Russian commentator a few days after the bombardment began. NATO, he argued, had bombed not only Milosevic but also the UN and post-Cold War Europe 'as an idea, as a political and civilisational project. Gorbachev's crystal dream of a "common European home" [has been] left in pieces '. 1 In this article I review the main developments of the Kosovo crisis in the context of NATO-Russia relations in the 1990s. The article goes on to highlight the divergence between official Russian interpretations and those of NATO, paying particular attention to conflicting views on international law as it pertains to sovereignty, the right of military intervention for humanitarian reasons and the use of force. The reactions of various constituencies in Russia are also examined. I then assess Moscow's contribution to the conclusion of hostilities and Russia's subsequent policy towards NATO. Finally, I address the most durable and problematic legacy of OAF: the perception among Russia's political elite that, rather than upholding liberal democratic values, NATO's intervention constituted a selective defence of the interests of the leading western powers and an act which bypassed 'traditional' international law and sidelined Russia in order to promote a particular vision of the European security order. The concluding part of the article considers how this view has influenced Moscow's position on the thorny question of Kosovo's independence from Serbia and Russia's more assertive foreign and security policy generally-not least in the recent conflict over South Ossetia. 1 A. Grachev, 'UN hit by NATO strikes', Moskovskie novosti, no. 15, 20-26 April 1999, p. 5.

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