The difficulties of knowing the start of war in the information age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008

Fawn, Rick; Nalbandov, Robert

doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.656601

Cited by 27 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(2 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The balance of power between the two historical antagonists was in flux. Although NATO declined to offer Georgia an institutional pathway towards membership earlier in 2008, tensions intensified, with each side accusing and counter-accusing the other of bad faith (Fawn and Nalbandov, 2012).…”

Section: Methodology and Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia’s rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea

Rodgers

Lanoszka

2021

Media, War & Conflict

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Most scholars working on Russia’s use of strategic narratives recognize the importance of the Russian state. Nevertheless, the authors argue that much of the attention on strategic narratives has given insufficient appreciation for how Russia has developed its military and media policies in a coordinated manner: learning from its mistakes and failures as it went along, and becoming more efficient each time. In making their case, they examine three theatres of Russian military activity and their accompanying media coverage: the wars in Chechnya in 1994–1995 and 1999–2000; war with Georgia in 2008 over the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and Ukraine, especially Crimea, since 2014. The Russian leadership addressed the shortcomings on each occasion, with the news media being increasingly weaponized as time went on. The authors argue that scholars should see Russia’s evolving uses of those military and media power resources as part of a single strategic process. How the Russian state goes about its media policy can accentuate the military intervention for better or for worse as far as its image is concerned.

show abstract

Section: Methodology and Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia’s rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea

Rodgers

Lanoszka

2021

Media, War & Conflict

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Gürcistan devleti de bağımsızlığını Sovyetler Birliği'nden sonra kazanmıştır. Gül Devrimi neticesinde Saakaşvili'nin Gürcistan başkanı olması devrim niteliğini taşımaktadır (Fawn & Nalbandov, 2012). Gürcistan Gül Devrimi ile beraber milliyetçi politikalara odaklanmış ve yönünü Rusya'dan ziyade Batı'ya çevirmiştir.…”

Section: Ab'ni̇n Rusya-gürci̇stan Savaşina Yaklaşimi: Fransa Li̇derli̇ği̇unclassified

“…Rusya kendi vatandaşları ve diğer vatandaşlar için uluslararası normların kapsamından ve uluslararası hukukun okumasının sonucu savaşa dahil olmak zorunda kaldığını söylemiştir. Saakaşvili ise yerel çatışmalar ulusal tehdit halini almış ve bu yüzden de Gürcistan müdahale etmek zorunda kaldı ifadesini kullanmıştır (Fawn & Nalbandov, 2008).…”

Section: Ab'ni̇n Rusya-gürci̇stan Savaşina Yaklaşimi: Fransa Li̇derli̇ği̇unclassified

“…Rusya'nın bu bölgeleri tanıması demek Rusya ve Gürcistan arasındaki ilişkilerin eskiye dönmemesi olarak algılanmıştır (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2015). Yaşanan savaştan sonra da Gürcistan Başkanı Saakaşvili jeo-kültürel olarak Rus karşıtlığı üzerinde durmuş ve kendilerini Avrupalı olarak düşündüklerini ve böylece Avrupa ve NATO'ya ihtiyaç duyduklarını ifade etmiştir (Fawn & Nalbandov, 2008).…”

Section: Ab'ni̇n Rusya-gürci̇stan Savaşina Yaklaşimi: Fransa Li̇derli̇ği̇unclassified

See 1 more Smart Citation

Avrupa Birliği’nin Rusya-Gürcistan ve Rusya-Ukrayna Çatışmalarına Karşı Tutumu: Almanya ve Fransa’nın Liderlikleri

Avar

2021

Akademik Araştırmalar Ve Çalışmalar Dergisi (AKAD)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AB üye devlet sayısı ve karmaşık kurumsal yapısından dolayı AB karar alma mekanizmasında çeşitli sorunlar yaşamaktadır. Karar alma mekanizmasında yaşanılan bu sorun, AB'nin kendi bölgesinde şahit olduğu çatışmalara karşı gösterdiği tutumu da etkilemektedir. Aynı problem AB içinde liderlik sorununu da doğurmaktadır. Bu iddiayı sağlam temellere dayandırmak için çalışma AB'nin Rusya ile yaşadığı sorunları incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.Purpose: Due to the number of EU member states and its complex institutional structure, the EU has various problems in decisionmaking procedure. The problem of decision-making procedure also affects the attitude of the EU towards the conflicts which EU has witnessed in its region. The same problem raises the problem of leadership within the EU. In order to base this claim upon solid foundations, the study aims to examine the EU's problems with Russia. Tasarım/Yöntem: Araştırmada nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden yararlanmış ve örnek olaylar üzerinden (Rusya-Gürcistan Çatışması ve Rusya-Ukrayna Çatışması) AB'nin liderlik anlayışı incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma derleme makale niteliğindedir ve literatür inceleme tekniği kullanılmıştır.Design/Methodology: Qualitative research methods has been used and the leadership understanding of the EU has been examined through case studies (Russia-Georgia Conflict and Russia-Ukraine Conflict). This study is a review article and literature review technique has been used. Bulgular: Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra Gürcistan ve Ukrayna yönlerini Rusya'dan ziyade Batıya ve özellikle de AB'ye dönmüşlerdir. 2008 yılında da Gürcistan, Güney Osetya ve Abhazya bölgelerinden kaynaklanan sorunlardan dolayı Rusya ile direk karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Fransa AB içinde Rusya'ya karşı ortak tutumda AB içinde liderlik etmiş olsa da istenilen başarı sağlanamamıştır. Ukrayna ise 2013 yılının sonlarında ise özellikle Kırım ve Donbas bölgelerinden dolayı da Rusya ile çatışma yaşamıştır. Bu krizde AB içinde liderliği Almanya üstlenmiş ama istenilen başarı yine de sağlanamamıştır. Kendi yakın çevresinde etkili olmayan AB'nin uluslararası politikada aktörlüğü bu durumlardan dolayı oldukça tartışılmıştır.Findings: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Ukraine have turned their face to the West, especially to the EU, rather than Russia. Georgia faced with the attacks of Russia in 2008 due to the problems arising from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although France led the EU in a common policy towards Russia, the desired success could not be achieved. And Ukraine had a conflict with Russia especially due to the Crimea and Donbas regions in the end of 2013. In this crisis, Germany took the lead within the EU, the desired success could not be achieved yet. The EU could not prevent the Russia-Georgia War, as well as the Russia-Ukraine War. Because of these situations, the EU's acting in international policy, which is not effective in its immediate vicinity, has been highly debated. Sınırlılıklar: Rusya, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna ile çeşitli sorunlar ve çatışmalar ...

show abstract

“…Tbilisi’s assertion that Russian military units were being transferred into South Ossetia in preparation for an invasion of Georgia, justifying the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, constituted an exogenous crisis frame and indeed the government’s main attempt to rationalize the expectations attached to the net-security contributor role (cf. Fawn and Nalbandov, 2012). In order to support its case, the Georgian government referred to intelligence indicating Russian movements of armor through the Roki tunnel on the night of 6–7 August, the day before the Georgian offensive (Chivers, 2008), as well as accounts from Russian officers who acknowledged entering South Ossetia well before the official start of the operation.…”

Section: Rationalization and Compensation During Georgia’s Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role conceptions, crises, and Georgia’s foreign policy

Nilsson¹

2018

Cooperation and Conflict

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article explores the scope conditions of national role conceptions as reference points for foreign policy decision making during crises. It aims to contribute to a refined perspective of the agency of new states undergoing socialization processes in relations with significant others. Drawing on a primary material consisting of interviews with Georgian and US officials, the article analyzes the significance of Georgia’s role conceptions in the country’s relations with the USA in relation to two major crises: the 2007 riots in Tbilisi and the 2008 war with Russia. The article posits that crises provide situational circumstances where the requirements of appropriate behavior associated with role expectations may enter into conflict with the demands of the immediate situation. In order to resolve ensuing role conflicts, actors face the need to both rationalize role expectations, and to compensate for departures from them. In turn, these strategies relate to the possibility for change and stability in role conceptions, and by extension their enactment in foreign policy. The analysis of the Georgian government’s management of the two crises demonstrates actions that implied both rationalization and compensation, aiming to retain the credibility of its existing role conceptions in the eyes of its US counterparts.

show abstract

The difficulties of knowing the start of war in the information age: Russia, Georgia and the War over South Ossetia, August 2008

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

Russia’s rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea

Russia’s rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea

Avrupa Birliği’nin Rusya-Gürcistan ve Rusya-Ukrayna Çatışmalarına Karşı Tutumu: Almanya ve Fransa’nın Liderlikleri

Role conceptions, crises, and Georgia’s foreign policy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About