The Very Idea of Pure Procedural Justice

Nelson, William

doi:10.1086/292181

Cited by 42 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Let me take this argument a step further. Rule-orientation always includes more than just concern about procedure or, to borrow John Rawls' term, procedural justice (Rawls 1999: 73-78; see also Nelson 1980). Bureaucrats believe that reliance on the principle of rule-orientation in everyday bureaucratic practice adds to the public good in substantial ways.…”

Section: Rule-orientation and The Public Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing the Boundaries of the Commonwealth

Loher¹

2020

Kultur Und Soziale Praxis

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Section: Rule-orientation and The Public Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing the Boundaries of the Commonwealth

Loher¹

2020

Kultur Und Soziale Praxis

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“…The outcome achieved through a 34 For discussion of perfect procedural justice, see 35 See, Rawls 1971. 36 For discussion of pure procedural justice see Rawls , 1999Nelson 1980;Arneson 2004. 74 3 Reaching Agreement Through Fair Process fair procedure is itself fair by virtue of the process that generates it.…”

Section: Procedural Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Tomlinson¹

2015

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“…I develop this claim in fuller terms in Ceva (forthcoming). For outcome-concerned discussions of proceduralism regarding justice, see, among others, Cohen (1994), Nelson (1980), Nussbaum (2006), and Rawls (1993).…”

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confidence: 99%

Just interactions in value conflicts: The Adversary Argumentation Principle

Ceva

2011

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a basic idea of procedural equality (all parties in a conflict should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But what happens once all parties have been heard if no agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly neglected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim that although the AAP might be inconclusive with regard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus considered anew through the lens of conflict management: as a principle of justice to characterize normatively the way conflicting parties should interact for their interaction to be morally justifiable to such parties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dynamics into cooperative ones.

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The Very Idea of Pure Procedural Justice

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

Governing the Boundaries of the Commonwealth

Governing the Boundaries of the Commonwealth

Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Just interactions in value conflicts: The Adversary Argumentation Principle

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