2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2123663
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The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity

Abstract: We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of controlling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less e¢ cient acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a …re sale price. Third, absent a liquidity shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. Using a structural estimation approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public corporations, we es… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 60 publications
(34 reference statements)
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“…These findings suggest that discounts arise when sales are urgent even when potential buyers are unaffected by the event forcing the sale. These results are consistent with Albuquerque and Schroth (2012), who model asset sales by use of a search model. Search frictions in the housing market result in fire sale discounts when sellers are forced to find buyers over short time horizons.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 90%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…These findings suggest that discounts arise when sales are urgent even when potential buyers are unaffected by the event forcing the sale. These results are consistent with Albuquerque and Schroth (2012), who model asset sales by use of a search model. Search frictions in the housing market result in fire sale discounts when sellers are forced to find buyers over short time horizons.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 90%
“…Although prior literature has documented that fire sale discounts exist and can be substantial (Pulvino, 1998;Coval and Stafford, 2007;Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008;Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak, 2011;Albuquerque and Schroth, 2012), it has been difficult to empirically identify when forced sales result in fire sale discounts. Forced sales are typically triggered by industry-wide or asset specific adverse shocks that affect both supply and demand for the asset.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%