The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations

Abstract

The author argues that the theory of moves, which has gained popularity in recent years as an alternative to game-theoretic analysis of strategic interaction, is fundamentally flawed. The theory's adherents argue that it makes theoretical progress by endogenizing the structure of games and introducing new ways of analyzing repeated interactions. The author analyzes the theory of moves from a game-theoretic perspective and challenges its theoretical claims. The author then reanalyzes several recent articles that have used the theory of moves, showing that its application to empirical cases is strained and that game theory can provide models that do a better job of fitting the stories the authors tell about them.

An exploration of risk management in global industrial investment

“…(Merna and Al-Thani, 2005) The essence of risk management lies in maximising the areas where we have control over the outcome while minimising the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us. (Bernstein, 1998) Developed from Anderson et al (1989), Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Brown (1995), Bernstein (1996), Connelly (1996), Gul (1997), Bernstein (1998), Stone (2001), Gardner (2008).…”

“…These are the key building blocks of any risk management system. The debate as to whether risk management is art, science or engineering is ongoing (Waring and Glendon, 1998;Pereira et al, 2000;Baloi and Price, 2003;Woods and (Anderson et al (1989), Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Brown (1995), Bernstein (1996), Connelly (1996), Gul (1997), Bernstein (1998), Stone (2001), Shi (2004), Gardner (2008). Wreathall, 2003;Haimes, 2004;Gerber and von Solms, 2005;McNeil et al, 2010).…”

The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken: an experimental study

“…The game of chicken thus appears to be a realistic description of strategic interactions, which is particularly suitable for describing relations between individuals, firms, institutions, social groups, political parties and countries that wish to coordinate for mutual benefit. It has also been used to describe military or political conflict (Snyder 1971;Stone 2001), as well as negotiations regarding environmental conventions (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993;Ward 1993).…”

Is Our Leaders Learning?

“…Speeches are scanned for indicators—specifically, transitive verbs—of who the political leader believes has power and how it can best be employed. Quantitative summaries of these beliefs are translated into a preference ranking over desired end‐states that is used in conjunction with Steven Brams’ Theory of Moves : a somewhat controversial approach to the game theoretical analysis of politics (Stone 2001; though see Brams’ rejoinder in same issue). Leaders are seen as self‐defining into a subjective game where they hold beliefs about their desired end‐state and the perceived desired end‐state of a relevant other: dominate, settle, deadlock, or submit .…”