The United Nations Compensation Commission: A new contribution to the process of international claims resolution

Wühler, Norbert

doi:10.1093/jiel/2.2.249

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…1969 Sie war nach ihrem Selbstverständnis kein Streitbeilegungsorgan, sondern ein politisches Organ, das Tatsachen feststellte und Entschädigungen in einem administrativen Verfahren zusprach. 1970 Gleichwohl musste die UNCC zu Fragen der Haftungsausfüllung und den Grenzen der Haftung des Irak nach der einschlägigen Sicherheitsratsresolution rechtliche Entscheidungen treffen. 1971 Dabei hatte sie, jedenfalls subsidiär, neben der sie konstituierenden Sicherheitsratsresolution, anderen einschlägigen Sicherheitsratsresolutionen und den Entscheidungen des Governing Council, im Bedarfsfall die Regeln des Völkerrechts anzuwenden, Art.…”

Section: Anwendung Einer Bestehenden Völkerrechtlichen Regelunclassified

Immaterieller Schadensersatz und der Wandel völkerrechtlicher Privatrechtsanalogien

Stendel

2023

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The study offers a comprehensive analysis of non-material damages in public international law enriched by historical, empirical, and sociological perspectives. Individual chapters examine how inter-state international law, the three major regional human rights systems (ECHR, IACHR, AfCHPR), and international investment law deal with those damages. These chapters are linked to the overarching issue of whether international law’s profound changes affected its private law heritage. As an analytical framework, the study employs the distinction between private and public law. Additionally, it offers insights into the national biases stemming from international law’s reception of private law and the resulting problems for its application.

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Section: Anwendung Einer Bestehenden Völkerrechtlichen Regelunclassified

Immaterieller Schadensersatz und der Wandel völkerrechtlicher Privatrechtsanalogien

Stendel

2023

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“…Возрождение интереса к международным комиссиям по рассмотрению жалоб как к инструменту урегулирования большого числа однородных споров связано с Комиссией ООН по компенсациям, созданной в 1991 г. для рассмотрения споров, связанных со вторжением Ирака в Кувейт в 1990 г. Комиссия, рассмотревшая в течение 15 лет своего существования более полутора миллионов жалоб на общую сумму, превышающую 350 млрд долларов США 5 , стала уникальным примером многостороннего международного органа, созданного для урегулирования массовых жалоб. Деятельность Комиссии, завершившаяся в 2005 г., считается успешным примером справедливого и эффективного урегулирования споров о международно-правовой ответственности (Giroud, Moss 2015, 487-488;Wuhler 1999). Комиссия не исследовала юридические вопросы международно-правовой ответственности (ответственность Ирака за причиненный вред была установлена Резолюцией Совбеза ООН № 687 6 ), а занималась установлением причинно-следственной связи между виновными действиями Ирака и вредом, причиненным иностранным лицам, и определением размера компенсации.…”

Section: институты рассмотрения массовых исков в международном правеunclassified

Mass claims in international investment arbitration

Ksenofontov¹

2022

Vestnik SPbSU. Law

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Following the economic crisis in Argentina international investment tribunals faced a new challenge: mass claims characterized with multiple claimants bringing the significant amount of homogeneous investment protection claims against the host state. Neither the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, nor applicable bilateral investment treaties cover the tribunals’ power to resolve mass claims. They are silent on crucial questions of jurisdiction and consent and do not address important procedural issues either. In these circumstances arbitral tribunals face the inevitablegap-filling process, which boils down to the critically important question of legal nature of mass claims. If mass claims are nothing more than a mere variety of “ordinary” claims, than the issues of special or “secondary” consent are irrelevant, since the general consent for arbitration will suffice for the tribunal to find itself competent to resolve the dispute. By contrast, if mass claims are different in their legal nature from “ordinary” bi- or multiparty arbitration, they cannot “fit” into the scope of parties’ general consent. In controversial Abaclat decision the majority ruled that the questions of tribunal’s powers to decide on mass claim brought by Italian investors against Argentina pertain to the sphere of admissibility rather than jurisdiction. This analysis was not accepted by dissenting arbitrator G. Abi-Saab. Interestingly, other multi-party “Argentinian” awards followed the line of argument which significantly differed from both the majority opinion in Abaclat and G. Abi-Saab’s dissent. This only highlights the controversial nature of mass claims in international investment arbitration. This article is dedicated to analysis of jurisdictional issues raised in the course of “Argentinian” arbitrations. Since this analysis is strongly intertwined with two other systems of resolution of mass claims, namely American class arbitration and public international law mechanisms dealing with the compensations for states’ international wrongdoings, these two mechanisms are also explored to provide better context and understanding.

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“…Panels consisting of three experts, acting in a personal capacity, appraised the merits of claims submitted by states and elaborated recommendations concerning the eligibility of claims and the specific amount of justified compensation (UNCC , paragraph 33). The Governing Council subsequently made the final decisions upon these recommendations (Wühler , p. 252; McGovern , p. 183). It was composed of the 15 Council members represented by their UN ambassadors in Geneva (Crook , p. 145; Caron & Morris , p. 186), where the UNCC was located.…”

Section: Toward Credible Commitment Without Losing Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Becker

Dörfler

Gehring

2018

Regulation & Governance

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Credible commitment problems arise whenever decisions made according to short-term incentives undermine long-term policy goals. While political actors can credibly commit themselves to their long-term policy goals by delegating decisions to independent regulatory agencies, the member states of international institutions rarely sacrifice control over regulatory decisions. Against the backdrop of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by the Security Council to settle claims on damage from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, we present an institutional arrangement that promises to credibly commit member states to their previously defined interests without excluding them from the decision process. It separates the stages of rulemaking and rule application, and is reinforced by conditional agenda-setting of an advisory body. We probe the theoretical claim with evidence from a unique data set that shows that the Commission settled compensation claims in a remarkably consistent way. The arrangement provides a blueprint for comparable regulatory tasks in many areas of international, European, or domestic politics, in which independent regulation is not feasible.

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The United Nations Compensation Commission: A new contribution to the process of international claims resolution

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Immaterieller Schadensersatz und der Wandel völkerrechtlicher Privatrechtsanalogien

Immaterieller Schadensersatz und der Wandel völkerrechtlicher Privatrechtsanalogien

Mass claims in international investment arbitration

Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

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