Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Abstract

Credible commitment problems arise whenever decisions made according to short-term incentives undermine long-term policy goals. While political actors can credibly commit themselves to their long-term policy goals by delegating decisions to independent regulatory agencies, the member states of international institutions rarely sacrifice control over regulatory decisions. Against the backdrop of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by the Security Council to settle claims on damage from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, we present an institutional arrangement that promises to credibly commit member states to their previously defined interests without excluding them from the decision process. It separates the stages of rulemaking and rule application, and is reinforced by conditional agenda-setting of an advisory body. We probe the theoretical claim with evidence from a unique data set that shows that the Commission settled compensation claims in a remarkably consistent way. The arrangement provides a blueprint for comparable regulatory tasks in many areas of international, European, or domestic politics, in which independent regulation is not feasible.

The effect of expert recommendations on intergovernmental decision-making: North Korea, Iran, and non-proliferation sanctions in the Security Council

“…the 15 Security Council members) followed the compensation recommendations of the expert panels in all cases, allotting a total of $52 billion despite a strong distributive conflict over compensation. 156 Beyond the Security Council and in light of increasing tensions, expert recommendations may be useful for solving similar problems of second-stage decision-making among great powers in other IOs. The comparative analysis shows that it is precisely the diverging preferences of great powers that give rise to coordination situations with multiple equilibria and the need for focal points, which in turn creates space for expert recommendations.…”

Designing Regulation Across Organizations: Assessing the Functions and Dimensions of Governance

“…(2018), for example, identify regulatory capabilities for 14 variables that include the authority to perform a limited range of functions, such as conducting research and imposing sanctions. Becker, Dörfer and Gehring (2018, p. 408) consider how structuring authority differently for rulemaking and implementation (or rule application) can provide “distinct institutional incentives for each of these functions.” Jacobs (2019, p. 396) notes that some statutes delegate authority differently for adjudicative, rulemaking, and enforcement authority. Buzbee (2005) considers the federalism structures best suited to environmental enforcement.…”

Credibility in enhanced self‐regulation: The case of the European data protection regime

“…One policy concern raised by scholars is how to encourage rule-takers to strengthen credibility toward self-regulation. Scholars suggest that to make regulatory regimes more credible, meaning more effective and legitimate, actors should delegate responsibilities to independent regulatory agents (Miller, 2000) or design regulatory arrangements that incentivize long-term policy preferences (Becker et al, 2018). Using and building on regulation intermediation theory (Abbott et al, 2017), I describe the causal mechanisms that explain the increased reliance on data protection officers (DPOs) in the new European data protection regime.…”