The unintended consequences of parliamentary involvement: Elite collusion and Afghanistan deployments in Canada and Germany

Abstract

This article argues that there is a need to question whether parliamentary involvement actually leads to the intended effects of increased democratic deliberation and responsiveness. We compare the unintended consequences of parliamentary votes on the use of force in two ‘most-different cases’: Canada and Germany. Despite substantive differences in the formal war powers of their parliaments, we find that military deployment votes on Afghanistan led to less democratic deliberation and responsiveness. Applying rationalist institutionalism, we argue that the deployment votes incentivised major parties to collude together to lessen debate on the Afghan mission, despite increasing public opposition and media attention. Rather than enhancing deliberation and responsiveness, as assumed by proponents of greater parliamentary involvement in military decisions, these parliamentary votes effectively diminished the willingness of parties to debate the mission.

Italian Political Parties and Military Operations: An Empirical Analysis on Voting Patterns

“…Third, as widely reported by recent literature (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ignazi et al 2012), we would assume the existence of a large and cross-time bipartisan consensus on the deployment of Italian troops. The expectations regarding such consensus also resonate well with the recent literature that has illustrated how parties can collude to lessen debates on missions, avoiding accountability (Lagassè and Mello 2018).…”

“…Finally, in line with the argument of a supposed ‘instrumentality’ of voting on Italian foreign and defence policy (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Carbone 2007), the findings illustrate how main opposition parties, despite an overall consensus on the missions expressed several times in the parliament, aimed to defeat the government before the assembly, exploiting divisions in the majority coalitions during ‘crucial votes’, when the government had a slim margin of support. In other words, on MOAs Italian parties have sometimes behaved as ‘office seekers’ rather than ‘policy seekers’ (Lagassè and Mello 2018; Strøm 1990). For instance, in parliamentary debates FI consistently backed the Italian contribution to Allied Harbour in Kosovo in 1999.…”

“…Third, a literature on ‘parliamentary war powers’ has recently emerged (Dieterich et al 2010; Lagassè and Mello 2018; Peters and Wagner 2011; Wagner et al 2017), highlighting the variations in parliamentary control of post-Cold War military dynamism, identifying the causes behind the differences (e.g. features of the political system, the state’s international context, etc.…”

The politics of multinational military operations

“…Lagassé (2010) argues that parliamentary votes can be used to launder responsibility. And it is not just a Canadian dynamic (Lagassé & Mello, 2018). 4.…”

“…Recent studies show that parliamentary war powers can have a tangible constraining influence on government use of military force (Wagner, 2018). Yet, there can also be unintended consequences of parliamentary involvement, which can have a debate-dampening effect and lead to elite collusion (Lagassé & Mello, 2018).…”