The Unexpected Negotiator at the Table: How the European Commission’s Expertise Informs Intergovernmental EU Policies

Abstract

How, if at all, does the Commission's expertise inform intergovernmental decision-making within the EU? In this article, we aim to capture the relationship between the Commission's expertise and its influence within intergovernmental policy-areas through a study of Commission influence in two least likely sectors: security and defence policies (military mission Atalanta and EU Maritime Security Strategy) and external migration (EU mobility partnerships with third countries). In these cases we observe that the Commission strongly informs policy developments even though it has only limited formal competences. To explore whether and, if so, how this influence is linked to its expertise, we develop and consider two hypotheses: The expert authority hypothesis and the expert arguments hypothesis. To identify possible additional channels of influence, we also consider the relevance of two alternative hypotheses: The strategic coalition hypothesis and the institutional circumvention hypothesis. We find that the Commission's use of its expertise is indeed key to understanding its de facto influence within policy-areas where its formal competences remain limited. Our findings add to the existing literature by revealing how expertise matters. Specifically, our cases show that the Commission informs intergovernmental decision-making by successfully linking discussions to policy-areas where it holds expert authority. However, the Commission also informs EU policies by circumventing the formal lines of intergovernmental decision-making, and by cooperating with member states that share its preference for further integration.

(Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European Commission Influences EU Security and Defence Policies

“…Its influence, however, remains to be studied systematically from an analytical perspective in which different theoretical perspectives are applied. In particular, few studies account for how the Commission putatively influences policy decisions (see however Blauberger and Weiss, ; Chou and Riddervold, ). The Commission is perhaps involved in decision‐making, but how, if in any way, does it exert influence within this formally intergovernmental domain?…”

“…Second, I discuss how it exerted such influence. I here draw on the main theoretical perspectives found in the EU integration literature to develop and discuss the relevance of three alternative hypotheses of Commission influence (building on Chou and Riddervold, ): first, by using available bargaining tools as leverage to enforce or build Member States’ support in favour of its proposals; second, by presenting expert‐based arguments that, if perceived as convincing by (at least some of) the Member States, may find their way into the policy‐making outcomes; third, by ‘circumventing’ the formally inter‐governmental line of policy‐making within the CFSP. By using these analytically distinct but empirically overlapping hypotheses to tease out the Commission's influence on Atalanta and the EUMSS, I expect to provide a fuller picture and a better understanding of the ways in which the Commission influences policy developments than is provided by the existing literature.…”

“…To tease out how, if in any way, the Commission influenced Atalanta and the EUMSS, I develop and discuss the relevance of three alternative hypotheses drawn from different strands of the EU integration literature (Chou and Riddervold, ). All build on the assumption that human action should be studied as the result of rational behaviour, that is, as intended actions performed to obtain a particular goal or intention.…”

“…Against this background it may thus be that the Commission influences policy‐making through mechanisms other than changing the bargaining game in favour of its preferences. To explore this possibility, I consider two alternative hypotheses building on alternative perspectives found in the EU integration literature (Chou and Riddervold, ). The first builds on communicative action theory (e.g.…”

“…Being communicatively rational, they may thus reflect on the relevance and validity of different arguments and also be convinced of why they should be complied with (Sjursen, ) – whether such arguments refer to material interests during aggregative bargaining or to expert knowledge or common norms, as one might typically expect during deliberative processes (Riddervold, ). It also builds on the empirical observation that Commission officials’ expert knowledge in different fields is important for understanding EU integration, including in inter‐governmental policy areas (Hooghe, ; Egeberg, ; Chou and Riddervold, ). After all, the Commission is ‘a body of unelected officials appointed for their expertise’ within Community policy areas (Hooghe, , p. 7).…”