The Unequal Case for Animal Rights

Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity

“…It is, at times, assumed without further justification that humans do have greater value. For instance, Moore uses the term 'unacceptable' to describe inter-species equality (Moore, 2002) without clearly stipulating where the unacceptability derives from. One can descriptively state that some of the pro-animal arguments are 'strange' in the context of common, anthropocentric notions, but to make prescriptive moral judgments about them requires more -the underlying belief in value-difference needs to be explicated.…”

“…Mary Ann Warren argues that farmers could not harvest their fields, for this would lead to the massacre of thousands of small animals, and obviously the right or interest to Environmental Values 19.1 live is superior to the right or interest to harvest (Warren, 1997). Eric Moore maintains that we would have no tools with which to choose between a hiker and a wolf (Moore, 2002), and richard Posner criticises 'the argument from marginal cases' (according to which consistency demands that animals and humans of equal mental ability be treated alike), stating that it would justify inflicting severe pain on an infant, if the only other option was to inflict even greater pain on a dog. We would also have to favour 100 chimps over one human being -a matter that causes Posner 'deep revulsion' (Posner, 2004, p. 66).…”

“…regard for the value, interests and/or rights of animals also requires regard for the frameworks that sustain animals -when discussing predation, one has not only to think about what happens to the rabbit that is eaten, but also what happens to the majority of animals if there are no predators left to do the eating. Moore has criticised this response by arguing that single interventions would not lead to large-scale harm: we could save the odd rabbit without ecological consequences (Moore, 2002). Therefore, it is suggested that the original problem still applies: Tom regan would have to stop the fox from killing the rabbit, for that one act would not have environmental consequences.…”

“…A possible answer is self-protection: we have the right to protect ourselves from other animals. However, Moore rightly points out that self-protection is not a solution, as the choice I am making is not necessarily between me and the wolf, but Mary and the wolf (Moore 2002). Everett has tried to tackle this problem by arguing that the duty to assist only applies in cases, where 'assistance is necessary as a matter of course for those creatures to flourish according to their nature' (Everett, 2001).…”