Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity

Abstract

Arguments for the inherent value, equality of interests, or rights of non-human animals have presented a strong challenge for the anthropocentric worldview. However, they have been met with criticism. One form of criticism maintains that, regardless of their theoretical consistency, these 'pro-animal arguments' cannot be accepted due to their absurdity. Often, particularly inter-species interest conflicts are brought to the fore: if pro-animal arguments were followed, we could not solve interest conflicts between species, which is absurd. because of this absurdity, the arguments need to be abandoned. The paper analyses the strength, background and relevance of this 'argument from absurdity'. It is claimed that in all of the three areas mentioned above, the argument faces severe difficulties.

Sentience and the Primordial ‘We’: Contributions to Animal Ethics from Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy

“…Nonetheless, Bekoff and Pierce caution that it is too soon to rule out that animal morality might in fact extend beyond direct caring responsiveness to encompass long-term goals and ideal states (Bekoff and Pierce 2009: 254). These considerations notwithstanding, reflective judgment is not a necessary condition for moral behaviour; and the evidence is undeniable that animals actively care for and have a sense of kinship with those of their own species and other sentient species -even Environmental Values 32 (2) humans (Warneken et al 2007;Bekoff and Pierce 2009;de Waal 2006;Pierce and Bekoff 2012;Andrews 2015;Weisberg 2015;Sato et al 2015;Aaltola 2010Aaltola , 2018.…”