The uncertain response in humans and animals

Not knowing what one knows: A Meaningful failure of metacognition in capuchin monkeys.

“…The early experiments designed to test for animal metacognition started with a dolphin (Smith et al, 1995) and rhesus macaques Smith, Shields, Schull, & Washburn, 1997). For example, Smith et al (1997) trained monkeys on a primary sparse/dense pixel discrimination task using a computer interface system that allowed the monkeys to use a joystick to move a cursor and make selections in classifying a stimulus as being dense or sparse in pixel density ( Figure 1A).…”

“…For example, Smith et al (1997) trained monkeys on a primary sparse/dense pixel discrimination task using a computer interface system that allowed the monkeys to use a joystick to move a cursor and make selections in classifying a stimulus as being dense or sparse in pixel density ( Figure 1A). The pixel density of the sample varied across trials with intermediate pixel density samples that were difficult to categorize psychophysically.…”

“…Researchers have also arranged a variety of different procedures that make predictions about animal performances assuming they possess metacognitive abilities. For example, in Smith et al (1997), it is possible that the UR was used as a proxy categorization response for intermediate densities. To address this, Shields et al (1997) evaluated whether monkeys and humans would use the UR when engaging in a same/different relative discrimination task, where macaques did not classify a specific density level, but chose whether two pixel-density magnitudes were equivalent.…”

Getting It Together: Psychological Unity and Deflationary Accounts of Animal Metacognition

“…Consider the following example, based on Carruthers' (2008: pp. 63-6) interpretation of data from uncertainty tests as discussed in, e.g., Smith et al (1997). We take the example from Carruthers' analysis noting that he does not address the matter of the set's unity.…”

“…That is, evidence of metacognition would almost surely be evidence of phenomenological consciousness. Indeed, over the last 20 years, evidence has appeared that seems to show that some animals-notably some monkeys (rhesus macaques, not capuchins), dolphins, rats, and baboons-do metacognize (Smith et al 1997;Washburn, Smith, and Shields 2006;Hampton 2009;Kornell, Son, and Terrace 2007;Hampton 2001; for dolphins : Smith et al 1995;for rats: Foote and Crystal 2007; for baboons : Malassis, Gheusi, and Fagot 2015). They can stop in their tracks, reflect on what they have seen and done, and even decide how much weight to give to their confidence that they do (or do not) know the answer to a question.…”