The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement

Robertson, Ian

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04385-y

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 89 publications

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“…Radical enactivism (RE, henceforth) claims that there are "basic" forms of cognitive activity-such as certain basic forms of perceiving (Myin 2021), imagining (Hutto 2015), emoting (Hutto et al 2018) and remembering (Hutto 2021)-that do not implicate representational content at all (Hutto andMyin 2013, 2017, see also Hutto 2005;Hutto and Satne 2015;Myin 2021;Robertson 2023). Their position rejects outright the cognitivist view that representational content is the "mark of the cognitive" (see, e.g., Aizawa 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination

Robertson

2022

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Hutto and Myin defend, on the basis of their "radically enactive" approach to cognition, the contention that there are certain forms of imaginative activity that are entirely devoid of representational content. In a recent Thought article, Roelofs argues that Hutto and Myin's arguments fail to recognise the role of representation in maintaining the structural isomorphisms between mental models and things in the world required for imagination be action-guiding. This reply to Roelofs argues that his objection fails because it fails to fully appreciate the resources radical enactivists have at their disposal in characterising basic imaginings.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination

Robertson

2022

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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A Problem for Autonomous Know-How

Robertson

2024

Erkenn

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In his recent Autonomous Knowledge monograph, J. Adam Carter develops a non-standard anti-intellectualist account of know-how. On this account, an agent manifesting know-how necessarily involves her exhibiting a particular kind of cognitive grasp of the mechanism by which she performs her action. Carter considers a potential problem for his new anti-intellectualism: namely, whether it precludes less cognitively sophisticated agents from knowing how. In this discussion piece, I argue that his attempts to assuage such concerns—by appeal to work by Duncan Pritchard—fails to address the problem.

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