The Tree of Life: Universal and Cultural Features of Folkbiological Taxonomies and Inductions

López, Andrea; Atran, Scott; Coley, John D.; Medin, Douglas L.; Smith, Edward E.

doi:10.1006/cogp.1997.0651

Cited by 319 publications

(270 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(48 reference statements)

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“…These differences can be explored by (i) comparing first and second factor scores of each individual and (iii) analyzing patterns of residual agreement. Residual agreement is calculated by subtracting predicted agreement from the observed agreement (24)(25)(26). To the extent that within-group residual agreement is larger than cross-group residual agreement, one has evidence of reliable group differences.…”

Section: Mental Models Of Nature Among Fish Expertsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural mosaics and mental models of nature

Bang¹,

Medin

Atran

2007

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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282

177

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For much of their history, the relationship between anthropology and psychology has been well captured by Robert Frost's poem, ''Mending Wall,'' which ends with the ironic line, ''good fences make good neighbors.'' The congenial fence was that anthropology studied what people think and psychology studied how people think. Recent research, however, shows that content and process cannot be neatly segregated, because cultural differences in what people think affect how people think. To achieve a deeper understanding of the relation between process and content, research must integrate the methodological insights from both anthropology and psychology. We review previous research and describe new studies in the domain of folk biology which examine the cognitive consequences of different conceptualizations of nature and the place of humans within it. The focus is on cultural differences in framework theories (epistemological orientations) among Native Americans (Menominee) and European American children and adults living in close proximity in rural Wisconsin. Our results show that epistemological orientations affect memory organization, ecological reasoning, and the perceived role of humans in nature. This research also demonstrates that cultural differences in framework theories have implications for understanding intergroup conflict over natural resources and are relevant to efforts to improve science learning, especially among Native American children.folkbiology ͉ mental models ͉ Native American ͉ science education T his review examines cognitive and behavioral consequences of cultural differences in conceptions of nature and conceptions of the role of human beings in it. The evidence suggests that these consequences are considerable, and as we piece them together, they form something of a mosaic. We concentrate on a set of comparative studies of a particular Native American and European American culture population, but the results are consistent with our previous findings and further suggest wider implications for culture and learning, in general, and science education, in particular. Our work falls at the interface between cognitive psychology and anthropology. A few decades ago, these two fields enjoyed a congenial division of labor, under which cognitive psychology's mission was to determine how people think and anthropology's focus was on what people think (1). But recent empirical research by cultural psychologists, cognitive anthropologists, and even philosophers (2-6) provides convincing evidence that cultural processes affect cognitive processes.These new observations have led to corresponding theoretical analyses. One approach to understanding cultural differences in cognitive processing (7) appeals to a ''cognitive toolkit'' and argues that cultures are associated with differences in the use and accessibility of particular strategies drawn from a common set of tools. Another approach (8) suggests that culture affects the chronic accessibility of constructs for approaching the social world (e.g., individu...

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Section: Mental Models Of Nature Among Fish Expertsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural mosaics and mental models of nature

Bang¹,

Medin

Atran

2007

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

Self Cite

282

177

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“…Infants also possess more meaningful or conceptual categories (Mandler, 1992), such as the distinction between kinds of objects (animate vs. inanimate or natural kinds vs. artifacts) or kinds of mechanical interactions (containment vs. support or inert vs. self-propelled), that allow them to interpret and make predictions about the outcome of physical and social events (e.g., Baillargeon, 1998Baillargeon, , 2004Leslie, 1994;Meltzoff & Moore, 1995;Premack, 1990;Spelke & Woodward, 1995). In adults, these are often referred to as natural categories (Ross & Murphy, 1999) and a great deal of effort has been placed on understanding how adults and children use these categories to draw inferences about the properties an object will possess or the purpose/function of an object (Gelman & Coley, 1990;Gelman & Koenig, 2003;Gelman & Markman, 1986;Kalish & Gelman, 1992;Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997;Malt, Ross, & Murphy, 1995;Malt & Smith, 1984;Markman, 1989;Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976;Ross & Murphy, 1999). These kinds of categories are evident very early in development, are relatively stable, and are gradually shaped over time by infants' and children's everyday experiences in the physical and social world.…”

Section: What Kinds Of Categories Are These?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Color–function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

Wilcox

Woods

Chapa

2008

Cognitive Psychology

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There is evidence for developmental hierarchies in the type of information to which infants attend when reasoning about objects. Investigators have questioned the origin of these hierarchies and how infants come to identify new sources of information when reasoning about objects. The goal of the present experiments was to shed light on this debate by identifying conditions under which infants' sensitivity to color information, which is slow to emerge, could be enhanced in an object individuation task. The outcome of Experiment 1 confirmed and extended previous reports that 9.5-month-olds can be primed, through exposure to events in which the color of an object predicts its function, to attend to color differences in a subsequent individuation task. The outcomes of Experiments 2 to 4 revealed age-related changes in the nature of the representations that support color priming. This is exemplified by three main findings. First, the representations that are formed during the colorfunction events are relatively specific. That is, infants are primed to use the color difference seen in the color-function events to individuate objects in the test events, but not other color differences. Second, 9.5-month-olds can be led to form more abstract event representations, and then generalize to other colors in the test events if they are shown multiple pairs of colors in the color-function events. Third, slightly younger 9-month-olds also can be led to form more inclusive categories with multiple color pairs, but only when they are allowed to directly compare the exemplars in each color pair during the present events. These results shed light on the development of categorization abilities, cognitive mechanisms that support color-function priming, and the kinds of experiences that can increase infants' sensitivity to color information.

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“…Western adults who have scarce knowledge of folkbiology exhibit more diversity than Western experts (e.g., Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002;Osherson et al, 1990;Proffitt, Coley, & Medin, 2000). Itza Mayas exhibit diversity when reasoning about abstract logic problems, but not when reasoning about categories they are familiar with like trees or plants (López, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997).…”

Section: Towards a Unified Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feature centrality and property induction

et al. 2004

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A feature is central to a concept to the extent that other features depend on it. Four studies tested the hypothesis that people will project a feature from a base concept to a target concept to the extent that they believe the feature is central to the two concepts. This centrality hypothesis implies that feature projection is guided by a principle that aims to maximize the structural commonality between base and target concepts. Participants were told that a category has two or three novel features. One feature was the most central in that more properties depended on it. The extent to which the target shared the feature's dependencies was manipulated by varying the similarity of category pairs. Participants' ratings of the likelihood that each feature would hold in the target category support the centrality hypothesis with both natural kind and artifact categories and with both well-specified and vague dependency structures.

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The Tree of Life: Universal and Cultural Features of Folkbiological Taxonomies and Inductions

Cited by 319 publications

References 49 publications

Cultural mosaics and mental models of nature

Cultural mosaics and mental models of nature

Color–function categories that prime infants to use color information in an object individuation task

Feature centrality and property induction

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