The Transient nows

Savitt, Steven F.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9107-0_18

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…For a review of these attempts see Hinchliff () and Savitt (). The same holds for recent proposals to identify the present with the so‐called Alexandroff region, discussed in Arthur () and Savitt (). It should be noted that these last two papers do not attempt to defend presentism.…”

supporting

confidence: 64%

“…As I have already pointed out restrictions imposed on the P , R relations induce restrictions over possible subregions of Minkowski spacetime that are suitable to represent the present of an event. In particular, (7) immediately rules out candidates that have been explored in presentist‐friendly literature such as the past light cone of an event (Godfrey‐Smith ), the event's elsewhere (Weingard ), and the so called Alexandroff region (Arthur ), Savitt () . This is because belonging to such regions turns out, given their geometrical properties, not to be an equivalence relation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It should be clear that neither Arthur () nor Savitt () are trying to argue in favor of presentism. So the argument in this paper does not refute theirs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Metaphysics of Time in Spacetime

Calosi

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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confidence: 64%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Metaphysics of Time in Spacetime

Calosi

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…If the reply is that metaphysical theses cannot in any case be supported by our perception or experience of the world (Prosser 12 This assumption excludes the region of spacelike-separated events, that of the lightlike-separated events, and that of the recently proposed "diamonds". A "diamond" relative to a timelike line L of arbitrary length is the (non-achronal) set of events that can be either causes or effect of any point on the line: see Arthur (2006) and Savitt (2009) for a defense of this conception of the present in Minkowski spacetime. A forceful reply to a criticism by Dorato (2011) is in Savitt (draft or this issues?…”

Section: The Presentist's Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism and the Experience of Time

Dorato¹

2014

Topoi

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Abstract:Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology (besides the physics) of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped.

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“…Some refute (Objectivity) by holding a local notion of presentness -these include, for example, Stein (1968, 1991), Dieks (1988, Clifton and Hogarth's (1995), Arthur (2006), Savitt (2009), and, arguably, Skow (2009) and Pooley (2013. Some refute (Objectivity) by holding a relativist notion of presentness -these include, for example, McCall (1994), Dolev (2006), and, arguably, Fine (2006.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusive disjunctivism – Presentness without simultaneity in special relativity

Jhou

2017

Analysis

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A-theoretic presentness is commonly regarded as non-solipsist and non-relative.The non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness requires at least two space-like separated things to be present simpliciter together -this co-presentness further implies the global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity of them. Yet, this implication clashes with the general view that there is no global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity in Minkowski space-time. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper explores the possibility that the non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness does not require at least two space-like separated things to be present simpliciter together. This can be done by holding exclusive disjunctivismthat mutually space-like separated things are present simpliciter exclusively disjunctively, and each one of them gets to be present simpliciter in a non-successive way (just like mutually time-like related things are present simpliciter exclusively disjunctively, and each one of them gets to be present simpliciter, but in a successive way).

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The Transient nows

Cited by 18 publications

References 7 publications

Metaphysics of Time in Spacetime

Metaphysics of Time in Spacetime

Presentism and the Experience of Time

Exclusive disjunctivism – Presentness without simultaneity in special relativity

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