The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

Chang, Yang‐Ming; Luo, Zijun; Zhang, Yongjing

doi:10.1080/10242694.2015.1126918

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Since when the two countries increase their security level under "full awareness", the terrorist group should "invest" more in terrorism. For instance, Chang, Luo, and Zhang [46] (2018) show that the unsupported party (terrorists in our model) reacts with higher effort and has a winning probability over 50%.…”

Section: Scenario Comparison: Myopia Vs Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 67%

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Faria

Novak²,

Bagchi

et al. 2020

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries. There are two scenarios: myopia and full awareness. Countries are myopic when they ignore each other’s security efforts, and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security efforts. A comparison between the scenarios shows that for an extremely impatient large country, full awareness yields a greater level of security effort for the large country, a greater level of security effort for the small country, and more terrorist attacks. This is, however, an unstable equilibrium. The full awareness model with a patient large country is stable and lies in between the previous model and the myopic model. Although it yields larger investments in security, this still results in more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. Continental safety is higher in the myopic model than in the full awareness model.

show abstract

Section: Scenario Comparison: Myopia Vs Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 67%

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Faria

Novak²,

Bagchi

et al. 2020

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…More specifically on this subject, several studies has attempted to quantify the options of prioritization for intervention structures and models (Wu, Xu, & Ke, 2019) (Belliveau & Stolte, 1977), which is all critical in understanding why some third party interventions are not in the same form of others. Specifically, in the discourse of third party interventions in conflicts, a growing literature can be found on the 3 rd party's role in symmetrical conflicts (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, n.d.), divided only by the specifics of the intervention speed (Conlon & Fasolo, 1990) and timing (Y. M. Chang, Luo, & Zhang, 2018). But this is where a major research gap exists, as there are no studies that focus the research gap discourse of third party interventions in asymmetrical conflicts, specifically on the constraints faced to deliver a collective security action.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hindrances to Third-Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution: United Nations and Patterns of Constraints in Resolving the Lord’s Resistance Army Conflict Between 2008-2012

Putra

2021

Acad. J. Interdiscip. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army has continued systematic human rights violations in the Central African region. Cases of kidnapping, village raids, mass rapes, and murders, have become defining factors to the urgency of resolving the crisis. In an attempt to respond to the conflict, the United Nations Security Council has initiated a number of political and military-based resolutions to control the conflict since 2008, which includes extending UN peacekeeping mandates in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan, as well as coordinate efforts with relevant African Union bodies. However, its success is far-reached, urging the need to contextualize the forms of hindrances that the UN faced in responding to the crisis. Employing Rourke and Bouyer’s (1996) concept of collective security and measures of response success, with a research limitation set to 2008-2012, a qualitative research utilizing secondary data is implemented, concluding the following hindrances that can be categorized into the following; (1) Implementation of the additional mandate of the UN Peace Forces, (2) Application of the AU Regional Task Force, and (3) Implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration program. Received: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 11 March 2021 / Published: 10 May 2021

show abstract

The Strategy of Third-Party Mediation Based on the Option Prioritization in the Graph Model

2019

J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

Cited by 5 publications

References 43 publications

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Hindrances to Third-Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution: United Nations and Patterns of Constraints in Resolving the Lord’s Resistance Army Conflict Between 2008-2012

The Strategy of Third-Party Mediation Based on the Option Prioritization in the Graph Model

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About