The Thief in the Mirror

Waal, Frans B. M. de

doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060201

Cited by 27 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…A closer look on previous studies, however, tells us how hard this test actually is for animals. According to de Waal ( 2008 ), hundreds of species have been tested for MSR, but only a handful has shown any evidence for it. In the studies that have succeeded in demonstrating MSR, usually only a few individuals have passed the test.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No evidence for self-recognition in a small passerine, the great tit (Parus major) judged from the mark/mirror test

et al. 2017

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Self-recognition is a trait presumed to be associated with high levels of cognition and something previously considered to be exclusive to humans and possibly apes. The most common test of self-recognition is the mark/mirror test of whether an animal can understand that it sees its own reflection in a mirror. The usual design is that an animal is marked with a colour spot somewhere on the body where the spot can only be seen by the animal by using a mirror. Very few species have passed this test, and among birds, only magpies have been affirmatively demonstrated to pass it. In this study, we tested great tits (Parus major), small passerines, that are known for their innovative foraging skills and good problem-solving abilities, in the mirror self-recognition test. We found no indication that they have any ability of this kind and believe that they are unlikely to be capable of this type of self-recognition.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No evidence for self-recognition in a small passerine, the great tit (Parus major) judged from the mark/mirror test

et al. 2017

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“…In some particular cases, what 'I' perceive is 'Me', such as when I visually recognize myself. Although many non-human animals can implicitly experience themselves as embodied agents through the types of self-specifying sensorimotor and homeostatic processes described above [26], only humans and a few other species seem capable of self-recognition [27], and thus of experientially relating the 'I' and the 'Me'. What we emphasize here is that whereas the 'Me' consists in the features one perceives as belonging to oneself, the 'I' consists in the self-specific, agentive perspective from which such perceptions occur; hence, to explain the 'I' we need to explain how such a perspective is implemented.…”

Section: Homeostatic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience

Christoff¹,

Cosmelli²,

Legrand³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases -sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation -and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the selfexperience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.Investigating self-experience in cognitive neuroscience How does the embodied brain give rise to self-experience? This question, long addressed by neurology [1] and neurophysiology [2], now attracts strong interest from cognitive neuroscience and the neuroimaging community [3][4][5][6].Recent neuroimaging studies have investigated selfexperience mainly by employing paradigms that contrast self-related with non-self-related stimuli and tasks. Such paradigms aim to reveal the cerebral correlates of 'selfrelated processing' (see Glossary). Recent reviews identify several brain regions that appear most consistently activated in self-related paradigms such as assessing one's personality, physical appearance or feelings; recognizing one's face; or detecting one's first name (see [4,6] for extensive reviews). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (Precuneus/ PCC) are the most frequently discussed [4-10], but two additional regions, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and temporal pole, are also consistently activated [6].Although these studies have contributed valuable information about the neural correlates of self-related processing, two issues have recently arisen [3,6]. First, the identified regions, especially the midline regions (mPFC, Precuneus/PCC) often associated with self-related processing [4,[7][8][9][10], might not be self-specific, because they are also recruited for a wide range of other cognitive processes -recall of information from memory, inferential reasoning, and representing others' mental states [3,5,6]. In addition, the PCC appears to be engaged in attentional processes and might be a hub for attention and motivation [11,12], whereas the TPJ is important for attentional reorienting [13]. Hence, describing these regions (singly or collectively) as self-specific could be unwarranted [3,5,6]. Second, studies employing self-related processing approach self-experience through the self-attribution of mental and physical features, and thereby focus on the self as an object of attribution and not the self as the knowing subje...

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“…Other than humans, the only animals that can pass the rouge test are chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970), orangutans (Suarez & Gallup, 1981), gorillas (Parker, 1994;Patterson & Cohn, 1994), dolphins (Reiss & Marino, 2001), and Asian elephants (Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006), suggesting that these species have at least some capacity for self-awareness and self-representation (for a critique of using mirror self-recognition as a marker for having a sense of self see de Waal, Dindo, Freeman, & Hall, 2005;de Waal, 2008).…”

Section: When Does the Self Emerge?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigations into the Human Self: A Naturalist Perspective

Damian¹,

Robins²

2012

Social Cognition

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This article provides an overview of theory and research on the self from a naturalist perspective. That is, we conceptualize the human self in the same way as any other natural phenomenon, seeking to understand its structure, ontogeny, evolutionary origins, and underlying neural, cognitive, and affective mechanisms. each section addresses a fundamental question about the nature and functioning of the human self: What is the self? how many selves do humans have? When does the self emerge? Do humans have accurate self-representations? Where is the self in the brain? how does emotion shape the self? And what are the adaptive functions of the self? For each question, we review relevant theory and research, with an emphasis on individual-differences in self-related processes.If Alien scientists from another planet were to study the inhabitants of the Earth, what would stand out about the human species? Our use of tools? Our leisure time and range of creative endeavors? Our complex social organization and interactions? Certainly all of these. But what would be perhaps most salient about the human species would be our inner world-the richness of our mental life. Tapping into the inner life of other species is unlikely to reveal the same complex stream of thoughts, feelings, and intentions.The capacity for self-awareness and self-representations seems to be a universal characteristic of humans. In all human cultures, people have an awareness of their internal thoughts and feelings and form relatively stable mental representations of themselves. The universality of these basic aspects of the self is a striking fact that is often overlooked in light of the substantial individual and cross-cultural variability that exists in the way the self is manifested.In our view, the human Self is responsible for many of the most perplexing and seemingly contradictory aspects of our species' behavior. Although most other

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The Thief in the Mirror

Abstract: The few animals capable of recognizing themselves in a mirror have advanced social cognition related to adopting the perspective of someone else.

Cited by 27 publications

References 13 publications

No evidence for self-recognition in a small passerine, the great tit (Parus major) judged from the mark/mirror test

No evidence for self-recognition in a small passerine, the great tit (Parus major) judged from the mark/mirror test

Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience

Investigations into the Human Self: A Naturalist Perspective

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