The taxation of nonrenewable natural resources

Gaudet, Gérard; Lasserre, Pierre

doi:10.4337/9780857937568.00010

Cited by 19 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…Suggestions by an OECD internal reviewer are also gratefully acknowledged. Lasserre (2012a, 2012b), van der Ploeg (2012), and Gaudet and Lasserre (2013). It fits well with the analysis of resource rent taxation systems in the spirit of Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983) and Garnaut (2010) and with the recent IMF review of Daniel et al (2010).…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 71%

Taxing the Rent of Non-Renewable Resource Sectors

Daubanes

Sá

2014

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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JT03360597Complete document available on OLIS in its original format This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. ECO/WKP(2014)45 Unclassified English -Or. English ECO/WKP(2014)45 2 OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works.Comments on Working Papers are welcomed, and may be sent to This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. © OECD (2014)You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to rights@oecd.org ECO/WKP (2014)45 3 ABSTRACT/RESUME Taxing the Rent of Non-Renewable Resource Sectors: A Theoretical NoteThis study analyses the economic rent generated by the exploitation of a non-renewable resource, and the taxation of this rent. We present a synthetic model of a non-renewable-resource sector where deposits must be costly developed before they are exploited; the analysis emphasizes the effect of resource taxation on the discouragement to the development of new reserves. We discuss the limitations of neutral profittaxation schemes and examine the distortions caused by various resource-taxation systems on the rent and its allocation: tax evasion, royalty-induced distortions, imperfect tax commitment, agency issues... We also discuss the measurement of resource rents for taxation purposes, and issues with the management of the resource tax income. JEL Classification codes: Q30; H20. Taxer la rente d'exploitation des ressources non renouvelables : une note théoriqueCette étude analyse la rente générée par l'exploitation d'une ressource non renouvelable, ainsi que la taxation de cette rente. Dans un modèle simple, nous représentons une industrie minière dont les gisements de ressource non renouvelable, pour être exploités, requièrent des efforts de développement ; l'analyse porte principalement sur les effets néfastes de la taxation sur la production de nouvelles ressources. Nous évoquons les limites à la possibilité théorique de ponctionner les profits de manière neutre, puis examinons les distorsions impliquées par les systèmes de taxation existants : évasion fiscale, capacité d'engagement limitée, rede...

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 71%

Taxing the Rent of Non-Renewable Resource Sectors

Daubanes

Sá

2014

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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“…In that first setting, we introduce a specific tax applied to the extracted flow of resource and we examine its effect in the spirit of Gaudet and Lasserre (2013). Unlike Hotelling models where only constant-present-value taxes are neutral (Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz, 1981), we show that resource taxes have in general no effect on current extraction.…”

Section: Structure and Main Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gaudet and Lasserre, 2013) or in the literature about market power on resource markets. Studies on the specific effect of taxes on resource monopolies are entirely based on Stiglitz's (1976) Hotelling-type analysis; e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax

Sá

Daubanes

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Demand for oil is very price inelastic. Facing such demand, an extractive cartel induces the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. Limit-pricing equilibria of non-renewable-resource markets sharply differ from usual Hotelling outcomes. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayResource taxes have no effect on current extraction; extraction may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax applies to oil and also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, inducing the cartel to increase current oil production. The carbon tax further affects ultimately-abandoned oil reserves ambiguously.JEL-Code: Q300, L120, H210, Q420.

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“…8 Optimal tax paths have been analyzed for example in Tahvonen (1997) and more recently in the mining context by Lappi and Ollikainen (2018). 9 One could also analyze a model, where the price is explicitly time dependent as in Krautkraemer (1988), Lozada (1993), and Gaudet and Lassarre (2015), but this may complicate the investigation of the time path of violation. See also Footnote 12.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Non-compliance of a Polluting Mine under an Emission Tax

Lappi

2019

SBE

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The production of different exhaustible resources, and mining in particular, are a source of stock pollutants and the growth of these stocks can be constrained by abatement and taxation. However, the firm may have incentives to non-comply with these regulations. This study analyzes the enforcement of an emission tax in a dynamic model, which includes stock externalities and abatement by the mining firm and by natural processes. The purpose of this investigation is two-fold. First, to study the consequences of a given enforcement scheme in a dynamic model and to generalize the results from previous static models. Second, to analyze the time paths of control variables and the violation level. It is argued that non-compliance in itself does not necessarily imply that net emissions from the mine are excessive compared to the full-compliance emission level. It is the possibility of a zero emission report that may cause the divergence from the socially optimal emission levels. The time path of violation and hence the path of unpaid taxes can have multiple shapes depending on the type of tax applied.

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The taxation of nonrenewable natural resources

Cited by 19 publications

References 28 publications

Taxing the Rent of Non-Renewable Resource Sectors

Taxing the Rent of Non-Renewable Resource Sectors

Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax

On the Non-compliance of a Polluting Mine under an Emission Tax

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