The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction between Rules and Principles

Abstract

Much has been said about the logical difference between rules and principles, yet few authors have focused on the distinct logical connectives linking the normative conditions of both norms. I intend to demonstrate that principles, unlike rules, are norms whose antecedents are linguistically formulated in a generic fashion, and thus logically described as inclusive disjunctions. This core feature incorporates the relevance criteria of normative antecedents into the world of principles and also explains their aptitude to conflict with opposing norms, namely that their consequents are fulfilled to varying extents more frequently than those of rules. I conclude that the property of genericity should be predicated to the norm antecedent of principles, more precisely to the hypothetical action. This is of paramount importance to explain, in terms of logical implication and exclusion, the expansibility of competing principles, in contrast with the exclusive character of conflicting rules.

Problem „težina“ Sukobljenih Ustavnih Načela U Analizi Proporcionalnosti (Odvagivanju)

“…29 Načelo razmjernosti (proporcionalnosti) u kontekstu prakse Europskog suda za ljudska prava nije samo "dodatak" sudačkom rasuđivanju; njegova je primjena nužna u slučajevima antinomija između prava ili prava i interesa. 30 Kako Smerdel ističe, u sudskoj praksi standardizirana su tri testa, odnosno tri koraka prema kojima se ispituje je li načelo razmjernosti poštovano u svakom pojedinom slučaju: 31 (1) Test prikladnosti. Mjera kojom se ograničava neko pravo mora pridonositi postizanju legitimnog interesa na koji se država poziva.…”

El "peso" de los principios: descifrando la metáfora

“…173-210;PINO (2009), pp. 133-136 y MARTÍNEZ (2011 MONIZ (2017), p. 472. Usualmente se distinguen dos posiciones teóricas respecto a la diferencia entre reglas y principios (débil y fuerte), pero Moniz Lopes agrega una tercera, según la cual no hay bases sólidas para hacer una distinción entre estas nociones.…”

“…12-19. De acuerdo con estos autores, hay una diferencia ontológica entre las reglas y principios.19 Esta es, como bien señala Moniz Lopes, la posición de Bartosz Brozek y Juliano Maranhao MONIZ (2017…”