The sybil attack in sensor networks

Newsome, James; Shi, Elaine; Song, Dawn; Perrig, Adrian

doi:10.1145/984622.984660

Cited by 1,144 publications

(728 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…creates a large number of virtual nodes in order to collect all traffic in a certain area [23]. Additionally, vehicle speed could be taken into consideration because higher vehicle speeds usually result in lower node densities.…”

Section: Maximum Density Threshold (Mdt)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized position verification in geographic ad hoc routing

Leinmüller

Schoch

Kargl

et al. 2008

Security Comm Networks

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SummaryInter-vehicle communication is regarded as one of the major applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Compared to MANETs or wireless sensor networks (WSNs), these so-called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have unique requirements on network protocols. The requirements result mainly from node mobility and the demands of position-dependent applications. On the routing layer, those requirements are well met by geographic routing protocols. Functional research on geographic routing has already reached a considerable level, whereas security aspects have only been recently taken into account. Position information dissemination has been identified as being crucial for geographic routing since forged position information has severe impact regarding both performance and security.In this work, we first summarize the problems that arise from falsified position data. We then propose a framework that contains different detection mechanisms in order to mitigate or lessen these problems. Our developed mechanisms are capable of recognizing nodes cheating about their position in beacons (periodic position dissemination in most single-path geographic routing protocols, e.g., GPSR). Unlike other proposals described in the literature, our detection system does not rely on additional hardware or special nodes, which would contradict the ad hoc approach. Instead, we use a number of different independent sensors to quickly give an estimation of the trustworthiness of other nodes' position claims. The different sensors run either autonomously on every single node, or they require cooperation between neighboring nodes.The simulation evaluation proves that the combination of autonomous and cooperative position verification mechanisms successfully discloses most nodes disseminating false position information, and thereby widely prevents attacks using position cheating.

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Section: Maximum Density Threshold (Mdt)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized position verification in geographic ad hoc routing

Leinmüller

Schoch

Kargl

et al. 2008

Security Comm Networks

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“…Security under typical attacks: In sybil attacks [9], an adversary tries to clone sensor nodes with different IDs. Since the keying materials for pairwise key establishment are always tied to the node ID, our approach is free from sybil attacks.…”

Section: E Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, since the wireless channel is essentially a broadcast channel, an attacker can easily eavesdrop, corrupt, forge, or replay any message in such communication channel. This will lead to many attacks such as DoS attacks [8], Sybil attacks [9], and Wormhole attacks [10]. Third, an adversary can easily capture a sensor node and quickly learn all the secrets inside [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resilient Cluster Leader Election for Wireless Sensor Networks

Dong

Liu

2009

2009 6th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks

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Abstract-Sensor nodes are often organized into clusters for efficiency and scalability purposes. Every sensor cluster is managed by a cluster leader during the network operation such as routing and data aggregation. Since managing a cluster consumes substantial energy, the cluster leader needs to be re-elected from time to time for load balancing. In hostile environments, it is critical to ensure the security of such leader election. This paper proposes an efficient, resilient, and fully distributed leader election protocol for sensor networks. It only uses efficient symmetric key operations and guarantees that (i) benign cluster members will elect the same leader as long as they are wellconnected, and (ii) attackers cannot impact the leader election process to increase or decrease the chance of a benign member being elected as a cluster leader. In addition, the proposed method can quickly recover from message loss or malicious attacks. The evaluation results also demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach. I. INTRODUCTIONIn a densely-deployed sensor network, sensors are usually organized into clusters for efficiency and scalability purposes. Every cluster contains a number of sensors that are physically close to each other and is managed by a cluster leader to facilitate the network operation such as in-network aggregation and routing. For instance, in data aggregation, a cluster leader can serve as the aggregator that collects the sensing results from other cluster members, computes the aggregation result, and reports the result to the base station.Since managing a cluster consumes substantial energy, the cluster leaders need to be re-elected from time to time for load balancing. The leader election problem is to ensure that each cluster will have a suitable sensor node be selected as the cluster leader whenever needed. A common election metric to determine the new leader of a given cluster is the remaining energy on sensor nodes. For the sake of presentation, we call the values (on sensor nodes) used for election purpose as the election values. In the above case, the election values will be the remaining energy reported by sensor nodes.A number of secure clustering protocols have been proposed recently for organizing clusters in sensor networks [1], [2]. These protocols significantly improve the security of clustering in the presence of malicious attacks. However, they only focus on the formation of clusters and do not consider the security of cluster leader election. Without proper protection, an attacker can easily subvert the intended purpose of clustering. For example, if the protocol selects the node with the most remaining energy as the new cluster leader, an attacker can continuously hijack the leadership by always claiming more remaining energy than anyone else in the cluster.

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“…In the Sybil attack (Newsome et al, 2004) a single node or nodes may impersonate a large number of different nodes thereby taking over a whole network of sensors. In all cases, attestation is a key defence against these attacks.…”

Section: B4: Network Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of secure middleware for the Internet of Things

Fremantle

Scott

2017

PeerJ Computer Science

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The rapid growth of small Internet connected devices, known as the Internet of Things (IoT), is creating a new set of challenges to create secure, private infrastructures. This paper reviews the current literature on the challenges and approaches to security and privacy in the Internet of Things, with a strong focus on how these aspects are handled in IoT middleware. We focus on IoT middleware because many systems are built from existing middleware and these inherit the underlying security properties of the middleware framework. The paper is composed of three main sections. Firstly, we propose a matrix of security and privacy threats for IoT. This matrix is used as the basis of a widespread literature review aimed at identifying requirements on IoT platforms and middleware. Secondly, we present a structured literature review of the available middleware and how security is handled in these middleware approaches. We utilise the requirements from the first phase to evaluate. Finally, we draw a set of conclusions and identify further work in this area.

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The sybil attack in sensor networks

Cited by 1,144 publications

References 15 publications

Decentralized position verification in geographic ad hoc routing

Decentralized position verification in geographic ad hoc routing

Resilient Cluster Leader Election for Wireless Sensor Networks

A survey of secure middleware for the Internet of Things

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