The super‐power's Dilemma: Negotiating in the nuclear age

Makins, Christopher J.

doi:10.1080/00396338508442250

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 2 publications

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“…Another body of work maintains that great powers not only respond to the behavior of other powers but reciprocate the behaviors directed toward them. This reciprocity is presumed by some theorists to provide the basis for the evolution of international cooperation (see Axelrod 1984;Axelrod and Keohane 1985;Gowa 1986;Huth 1988;Jensen 1986;Jervis 1981;Keohane 1986;Larson 1988;Leng and Wheeler 1979;Makins 1985;Oye 1986;Stoll and McAndrew 1986).…”

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confidence: 98%

U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?

Goldstein

Freeman

1991

Am Polit Sci Rev

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International relations theorists disagree about whether great power behaviors reflect bureaucratic routine or reciprocity. Recently, some have suggested that these behaviors result from great powers' rational expectations rather than from simple routine or reciprocity. The debate is flawed in several respects. The quasi-experimental studies of great power behavior suffer from specification and measurement errors. Furthermore, most studies of great power behavior focus exclusively on the superpowers, without adequately appreciating China's role in world politics. We present an improved analysis that recognizes the potential effects of Chinese behavior and ameliorates the methodological flaws in existing work. The results indicate that the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China are a relatively stable mix of bureaucratic routine and reciprocity. The results also indicate complex, asymmetrical connections among U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations, consistent with the notion of a strategic triangle.

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