The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior inUruguay

Abstract

How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in Uruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.

The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

“…3 That is, we are interested in political behavior in a setting characterized by nonstatic ambition (Schlesinger 1966;Squire 1988): Given the chance, legislators prefer to "jump" to an executive position rather than continuing in the legislature. This is common in several Latin American countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (Ames 2001;Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014;Cunow et al 2012;Jones et al 2002;Micozzi 2014aMicozzi , 2014bPereira and Renn o 2013;Power 2000;Samuels 2003). 4 To be sure, nonstatic ambition does not mean that legislative positions are without value.…”

Political Ambition in 14 Presidential Democracies

“…Similarly, Mexican legislators begin their careers on the municipal and state levels and respond strongly to regional governors in light of possible future careers in the states (Langston ). Even unitary settings show that regional offices (Chasquetti ; Chasquetti and Micozzi ), the national executive (Taylor ), or reelection (Botero ) offer attractive incentives. Reelection‐seekers can also end up making “unorthodox” moves due to party competition (Botero ).…”

“…This article tackles the nature of political ambition and legislators' behavior in 14 Latin American democracies. A closer look at the ambitions that individuals harbor merits attention for two main reasons: First, availability of individual data has allowed transcending parties as unitary actors and advanced the study of individual behavior in roll‐call voting (Morgenstern ), party‐switching (Desposato ), party unity (Carey ), coalitions (Altman ), ministerial appointments (Camerlo ), or the role of ambition in legislative behavior (Botero ; Chasquetti ; Chasquetti and Micozzi ; Micozzi ; Samuels ). Second, recent institutional reforms aiming at improving the quality of representation have encouraged politicians to bring in a more personalized focus to politics (Karvonen ), emphasizing the importance of strategic politicians “in tandem” with a trend toward candidate‐centered politics (Jacobsen ).…”

“…When planning career moves, they can either use their party as a vehicle to get further in their career or rely on personal resources to build their personal reputation independent from their party (Carey ). Studies have modelled how legislators adopt party or faction‐oriented behavior versus enhancing their own image (Chasquetti and Micozzi ) or how cosponsorship reflects provincial and municipal‐level ambitions in the Argentine congress (Micozzi ). Case studies have relayed novel findings but have maintained variance mainly at the institutional level.…”

Austeridad, ideología comprometida y Asamblea proactiva-particularista en Costa Rica, en 2019

“…Su análisis está más enfocado en los recursos fiscales que maneja el Poder Ejecutivo, que utiliza para negociar con diputados. Sin embargo, existe evidencia de que las personas legisladoras también utilizan los recursos legislativos -como iniciativas de ley y control de comisiones que tienen implicaciones locales-para impulsar su agenda particularista (Stratmann y Baur 2002;Crisp et al 2004;Chasquetti y Micozzi 2014;Muñoz-Portillo 2020). Aunque no aspiro a probar una relación causal entre la aprobación de leyes particularistas y leyes sustantivas, sí considero que la descripción que presento a continuación brinda una aproximación reciente, para un tema que ha sido poco estudiado en la política costarricense.…”