The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

Abstract

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? In this article, we explore how a scattered electoral calendar affects politicians' career choices in a setting in which legislators show little interest in re-election. Employing a simple decision-theoretic model, we show that the combination of (1) politicians with little interest in pursuing a legislative career-nonstatic ambitionand (2) staggered membership renewal (SMR)-the fact that legislators belonging to the same body are elected at different points in time (Goetz et al. 2014)-can induce a self-selection process among ambitious politicians who differ in their underlying quality. Specifically, politicians with previous executive experience have strong incentives to run for legislative office in concurrent elections, while their less experienced peers are better off by self-selecting into midterm elections. The electoral calendar should

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Caminos al poder político: el efecto de la magnitud del distrito y la experiencia previa para las carreras políticas de congresistas en Colombia

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