The Subjective Experience of Poverty

Abstract

What significance should the subjective experiences of poor people have in a normative philosophical critique of poverty? In this paper, we take up this question and answer it by looking at two different normative theories: the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and the recognition approach of Axel Honneth. While Sen and Nussbaum are largely quite reluctant toward the role of subjective experiences of poor people, the recognition approach views them as central for its social critique of poverty. We will defend the thesis that a more inclusive view on the role of the subjects of suffering and injustice is needed, that such subjective experiences and the unique first-hand knowledge it produces cannot be substituted by objective criteria, while such criteria are needed to bolsterand in some cases also criticize -the poverty knowledge of poor people. sats 2014; 15(2): 148-167 Brought to you by | Simon Fraser University Authenticated Download Date | 6/7/15 5:48 AM( Brock 1999;Norton 2001). The rise of the debate about subjective well-being, which obviously cannot be determined objectively without reference to the interior view, and its use for poverty research is also an indicator for this (Kingdon and Knight 2006). Finally, the role of poor people themselves in the conceptualization, measurement, and evaluation of poverty is in question. Do they know best or maybe better than the poverty researchers what poverty means or should mean? Neither poverty research nor normative philosophy is situated outside the real world, which is full of relations of power and domination, and it is a fact that some knowledge is privileged and a few have the power to shape the discourse about poverty (Chambers 2007).These questions also touch upon normative questions in moral, social, and political philosophy, when it comes to the philosophical evaluation of poverty. The discussion is complex, and there is considerable disagreement about many issues such as questions concerning the ethical responsibility for the current situation and ethically demanded solution strategies. However, a widely shared understanding is that worldwide poverty is not only bad for poor people and to a minor extent also for the rich, but somehow morally wrong and unjust (Mack et al. 2009). Within this realm of normative discussions, one question that is hardly ever treated explicitly is concerned with the role of poor people themselves in ethical theories of poverty and in normative evaluations of their living conditions. The moral wrongness of poverty is often only assumed -which is not a false assumption as we want to make clear -and presented as a fact, without reference to the poor as authoritative subjects on these matters who should have a say in defining and evaluating this moral wrongness and injustice of their own living conditions. There is some discussion about the poor as agents of justice, and it is clear that they are important for the detection of poverty and also to design the right measures to overcome and alleviate poverty (D...

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