The Stubborn Non-probabilist—‘Negation Incoherence’ and a New Way to Block the Dutch Book Argument

Wroński, Leszek; Godziszewski, Michał Tomasz

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_18

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…If there are n truth values, we could equivalently be talking either about B or about n functions from Sent L to [0, 1]; for example, in the case where TV has three elementswhatever they areit might be convenient to speak about a credence function by referring to the indexed set of functions {B 1 (⋅), B 1/2 (⋅), B 0 (⋅)}. 28 While the ideas here are meant to be general, so that a variety of nonclassical logics and corresponding notions of credence can be considered, all examples illustrating our 25 This is problematic on its own; see Hedden (2013), Godziszewski (2017), andPettigrew (2021). (For starters, when arguing for probabilism it is a mistake to assume that B(¬A) = 1 − B(A); this should be a conclusion, not an assumption.)…”

Section: Credences As Complex Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books

Sanchez

Gyenis²,

Wroński³

2022

Episteme

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We report a solution to an open problem regarding the axiomatization of the convex hull of a type of nonclassical evaluations. We then investigate the meaning of this result for the larger context of the relation between rational credence functions and nonclassical probability. We claim that the notions of bets and Dutch Books typically employed in formal epistemology are of doubtful use outside the realm of classical logic, eventually proposing two novel ways of understanding Dutch Books in nonclassical settings.

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Section: Credences As Complex Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books

Sanchez

Gyenis²,

Wroński³

2022

Episteme

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“…, G n , if the maximum price that an agent can rationally pay for each bet G i is p i , then the maximum price that the agent rationally pay for the entire collection is just the sum of the p i 's. For discussion of the first principle, seeHedden (2013),Wrónski and Godziszewski (2017) andPettigrew (forthcoming). For discussion of the second principle, seeBuchak (2013, Chapter 7).11 When the credence function c is a probability function, this will just be the expected payoff of the book.…”

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confidence: 99%

Externalism and exploitability

Das

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update—or at least should plan to update—her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence externalism, i.e., the view that an agent's evidence can entail non‐trivial propositions about the external world. I argue that this tension casts doubt on the idea that diachronic Dutch books can be used to justify or vindicate updating plans.

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“…In this paper, we focus on the Dutch Book Argument and a recent style of objection to it raised by Brian Hedden (2013) and again by Leszek Wro ński and Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (Wro ński & Godziszewski, 2017;Wro ński, 2018)-I call this the expected utility objection. We specify Probabilism precisely in Section 1.…”

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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism*

Pettigrew

2019

Nous

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The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden, 2013; Wroński & Godziszewski, 2017; Wroński, 2018)-I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even the proponent of the Expected Utility Objection should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.

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The Stubborn Non-probabilist—‘Negation Incoherence’ and a New Way to Block the Dutch Book Argument

Cited by 3 publications

References 12 publications

Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books

Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books

Externalism and exploitability

On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism*

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