The present work described the disorder induced magnetic properties of Sr2FeMoO6 (SFMO) samples. The crystal structure and magnetic order of SFMO samples with nanosized grains were studied using x-ray diffraction spectrum, scanning electron microscope morphology, and magnetic measurements. Thermal annealing of as prepared chemical routed materials showed an increase in grain size and in the magnetic moment per formula unit. A small decrease in magnetic moment was noted at higher annealing temperature. At the same time, the ac susceptibility measurement indicated the presence of a magnetic spin glass phase in the material, coexisting with the ferromagnetic matrix. The observation of the magnetic glassy phase confirmed the presence of intrinsic disorder in the lattice structure of SFMO. The signature of intrinsic disorder in the samples, irrespective of annealing temperatures, is also realized from the splitting of temperature dependent field cooled and zero field cooled magnetization curves. Such magnetic splitting in the temperature dependence of magnetization curves is suppressed at a higher magnetic field. A careful analysis of the temperature and field dependent magnetization data provided more insight on the grain size dependent disorder in the double perovskite structure.
An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self‐knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic.
In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism: namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this the ‘value of information’ thesis. I show that the value of information thesis conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where the value of information thesis fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of the value of information thesis.
Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall callUr-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension withEvidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent’s evidence may entail nontrivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is incompatible withEvidence Externalism. I go on to suggest that even if we don’t acceptEvidence Externalism, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification forUr-Prior Conditionalizationare bleak.
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update—or at least should plan to update—her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence externalism, i.e., the view that an agent's evidence can entail non‐trivial propositions about the external world. I argue that this tension casts doubt on the idea that diachronic Dutch books can be used to justify or vindicate updating plans.
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