1994
DOI: 10.2307/2786879
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The Structure of Social Justice Judgments: A Facet Approach

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Cited by 81 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…Because we now have strong and additional evidence that justice judgments can occur spontaneously, we can conclude that not necessarily are controlled processes needed for people to come to justice judgments. Therefore, the current results suggest a disconfirmation of an important assumption of earlier justice models stating that the justice judgment process constitutes a particularly controlled process (see, e.g., Jasso, 1999;Sabbagh et al, 1994). Rather, we can conclude that cognitive reactions to justice-related events probably consist of both spontaneous (as indicated by the current research) and controlled (as indicated by earlier research) processes (see, e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and future research could investigate the relation between these processes.…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 73%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Because we now have strong and additional evidence that justice judgments can occur spontaneously, we can conclude that not necessarily are controlled processes needed for people to come to justice judgments. Therefore, the current results suggest a disconfirmation of an important assumption of earlier justice models stating that the justice judgment process constitutes a particularly controlled process (see, e.g., Jasso, 1999;Sabbagh et al, 1994). Rather, we can conclude that cognitive reactions to justice-related events probably consist of both spontaneous (as indicated by the current research) and controlled (as indicated by earlier research) processes (see, e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and future research could investigate the relation between these processes.…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 73%
“…Part of why we think more systematic evidence is needed is conceptual. That is, earlier studies have disputed that individuals consider the justice implications of events spontaneously (see, e.g., Jasso, 1999;Sabbagh, Dar, & Resh, 1994). Related to this, well-known moral psychologists have stated explicitly that assessing morality is caused primarily by careful, intentional reasoning processes (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969;Piaget, 1975;Turiel, 1983) whereas others assume, yet do not show, that assessing morality ''is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions)'' (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a context of work-family policies, an example might be someone who does not use any of the policies comparing their self to an equally hard-working counterpart who does use them (higher outcome for equal input). Perceptions of imbalance like this can have important consequences for the workplace, such as withdrawal of input to match perceived reduced outcome-for-input ratios (Sabbagh, Yechezkel, & Nura, 1994;Sashkin & Williams, 1990). If work-family policies are becoming more popular, then organisations need to be aware of employee attitudes towards the fairness (and equity) of these policies, and toward the wide range of 'others' that might use them.…”
Section: Organisational Justice Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given the large proportions of variance which have remained unexplained in experimental justice research and given more or less incidental evidence on group differences in allocation behavior (Gergen, Morse, & Gergen, 1980;Major & Deaux, 1982), scholars and research groups have become more and more interested in individual differences in justice attitudes and justice behavior. Measures for belief in a just world (Rubin & Peplau, 1973;Furnham & Procter, 1992;Lipkus, 1991;, for attitudes towards principles of distributive justices (Bossong, 1983;Herrmann & Winterhoff, 1980;Sabbagh, Dar, & Resh, 1994;Schwinger & Winterhoff-Spurk, 1984;, for attitudes towards principles of procedural justice (Dörfel, 1995;Wahner, 1986), for centrality of justice as a value , and for dispositional sensitivity to unjust own advantages were developed and related to various psychological antecedents and consequences such as to indicators for the secondary victimization of victims (e.g., and to allocation behavior (e.g., . The last abovementioned construct, sensitivity to unjust personal advantages, is of special interest in the present context.…”
Section: Sensitivity To Befallen Injustice As a Personality Constructmentioning
confidence: 99%