The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences

Jackson, Matthew O.; Nicolò, Antonio

doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00223-0

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…However, we can easily establish a negative result: no e¢ cient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable (because it is not Maskin monotonic). This result is related to previous results in Jackson and Nicolò (2004) who study similar social choice problems in a context where agents have single-peaked preferences over an in…nite and linearly ordered set of alternatives. They show that, in general, strategy-proof and e¢ cient social choice functions must …x the group of users independently of agents'preferences.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 83%

“…AnA(p 1 ; :::; p m ) such that k m+1 max fk 1 ; :::; k m g or does not propose any- 8 To iterate the order 1; :::; n we proceed as follows. It is easy to check that each positive integer m 2 N can uniquely be written as m = tn + r for some t 2 N[f0g and 1 r n. De…ne this number as r m[mod n].…”

Section: The Mechanism and The Main Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The structure of the problem (the social choice has two components: the level of the public good and the set of its users) as well as previous results in similar frameworks (see Jackson and Nicolò (2004) and Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2005)) suggest that in order to achieve e¢ ciency and stability the selection of the alternative to be chosen and the group of its users must be separated. Therefore a two-stage mechanism seems to be a natural way to implement an e¢ cient and stable social choice function.…”

Section: Spne Implementation: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Massó

Nicolò

2008

Games and Economic Behavior

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We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a …nite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the …nal allocation be e¢ cient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós,

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 83%

Section: The Mechanism and The Main Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Spne Implementation: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Massó

Nicolò

2008

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Gordon (2007a) generalizes this literature on the solidarity principle to a more abstract non-geometric setting that contains location problems of single and multiple facilities as special cases. 6 Jackson and Nicolò (2004) also study location problems with congestion, but restrict attention to the single facility case. 7 There are different ways to extend preferences over points to preferences over sets.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Bochet

Gordon

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

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“…Congestion describes the decrease in utility to the individuals as a result of the sharing. Much of the work on clubs and public goods focuses on the issues of cost sharing and incentive compatibility (see, e.g., [7]). While there has been some work on equilibria in games between different clubs trying to maximize profits (e.g., [15]), these tend to focus on the competition between multiple clubs vying for customers rather than an optimal auction for membership in one club with given size.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders

Salek

Kempe

2008

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We introduce and study share-averse auctions, a class of auctions with allocation externalities, in which items can be allocated to arbitrarily many bidders, but the valuation of each individual bidder decreases as the items get allocated to more other bidders. For single-item auctions where players have incomplete information about each others' valuation, we characterize the truthful mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue, and analyze it for some interesting cases. We then move beyond single-item auctions, and analyze single-minded combinatorial auctions. We derive sufficient conditions for a truthful allocation in this setting. We also obtain a √ m-approximation algorithm for maximizing social welfare, which is essentially tight unless P=NP.

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The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences

Cited by 25 publications

References 19 publications

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders

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