Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders

Salek, Mahyar; Kempe, David

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_67

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In [8], the authors study auctions with share-averse bidders, i.e., bidders suffering from negative externalities when item is shared amongst multiple competitors, exactly as in online advertising. However, while the authors study the problem of characterizing the revenue-maximizing single item auction for this setting, we are interested in an auction that exactly matches the current GSP auction when multiple slots are displayed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

Ghosh

Sayedi²

2010

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web

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When online ads are shown together, they compete for user attention and conversions, imposing negative externalities on each other. We study the simplest form that an advertiser's valuation can have in the presence of such externalities-an advertiser's value depends on whether her ad is shown exclusively, or along with other ads. A mechanism such as the GSP auction, which always displays a full slate of ads, can be arbitrarily inefficient given such two-dimensional valuations; further, expanding the outcome space need not be enoughwhen the advertiser pays for an impression or a click, but derives value from a conversion, the private value of the advertiser is affected by the externality as well, leading to the need for a more expressive bidding language.In this paper, we study the design of expressive mechanisms which are extensions of the GSP auction currently used in practice. Our mechanisms show either a single ad exclusively, or multiple ads simultaneously, with the property that the allocation and pricing are identical to GSP when multiple ads are shown. We investigate the equilibria of these mechanisms, and show that the revenue when multiple ads are shown dominates the VCG revenue. In equilibria where a single ad is shown, the revenue can actually be lower than that of VCG; however, this loss is bounded within a factor of two.The increased efficiency from using the more expressive mechanism can come, unfortunately, with a loss in revenue with respect to the existing GSP mechanism in some cases. We design a mechanism which has a one-dimensional bidding language, while still allowing two types of outcomes, for situations where the private values are approximately one-dimensional. We show that this mechanism, while retaining the revenue and efficiency properties of the previous mechanisms, also revenue dominates the existing GSP mechanism.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

Ghosh

Sayedi²

2010

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web

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“…In reality, all of these cannot be used for the allocation of computing resource in the blockchain in a direct way, principally because of the uniqueness of the mobile blockchain network. In the mobile blockchain network, special consideration should be given to external factors [14,15] of distribution. For example, in addition to the computing resources they receive, each miner is very concerned about the computing power of other miners.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction in Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain

Zhu

2020

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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The mobile blockchain has been recognized as an emerging solution to address the security and privacy issues in a mobile application system. The mining process in mobile blockchain requires high computing resources which could overwhelm that which mobile devices can offer. In this case, mobile edge computing servers (MESs) can be involved to offer computing services to miners in mobile blockchain. Note that the resources of MESs are also limited; MESs could further request resources from the cloud computing server (CCS). Accordingly, the issue of hierarchical computing resource allocation arises. In this paper, we first consider a simple case with single-seller multiple buyers and a hierarchical single-seller multibuyer combinatorial auction model is proposed to solve this problem, based on which efficient and truthful frameworks are provided. We then extend the model to consider multiple CCSPs and propose a hierarchical multiple-seller multiple-buyer combinatorial auction model. For both models, the winner determination problems are formulated and computationally tractable algorithms are proposed. Also, pricing schemes are proposed to ensure the property of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, we evaluate the proposed schemes via simulations.

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“…However, none of these works can be directly applied to edge computing applications for mobile blockchain, since they only focused on the specific properties constrained by the studied topics. For example, in the blockchain networks, the allocative externalities [16], [17] should be considered because of miners care about the computational power allocated to the others. The authors in [18] used deep learning to recover the classical optimal auction for revenue maximization and applied it in the edge computing resources allocation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain

Jiao

Wang

Niyato

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)

138

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Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things. However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization problem for the edge computing service provider.

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Auctions for Share-Averse Bidders

Cited by 12 publications

References 14 publications

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction in Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain

Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain

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