1954
DOI: 10.2307/1844715
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The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine

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Cited by 9 publications
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“…However, there were signifi cant differences between Hoover's and Stimson's conception of what exactly the policy entailed. In an authoritative analysis of the formulation of the nonrecognition doctrine, Richard Current (1954) argues that Hoover's position was that the nonrecognition doctrine was a substitute for action, something that obviated the need for any stronger sanction. Stimson instead sought to use nonrecognition as a way of signalling to Japan the potential for future more potent action.…”
Section: The Us and Nonrecognition In The Manchurian Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, there were signifi cant differences between Hoover's and Stimson's conception of what exactly the policy entailed. In an authoritative analysis of the formulation of the nonrecognition doctrine, Richard Current (1954) argues that Hoover's position was that the nonrecognition doctrine was a substitute for action, something that obviated the need for any stronger sanction. Stimson instead sought to use nonrecognition as a way of signalling to Japan the potential for future more potent action.…”
Section: The Us and Nonrecognition In The Manchurian Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…41 And President Hoover chose not to recognize Manchukuo in 1931. 42 The exercise of the de-recognition power usually follows internal regime change or war. For example, thirty years following the Chinese Civil War, President Carter de-recognized the Republic of China (ROC) as the sovereign government of China.…”
Section: A the Recognition Power -An Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An absence of action by the League would have looked like approval or acceptance of Japan’s actions. Nonrecognition was suggested as an novel option (initially by Hoover (Current, 1954)) because there was no existing provision for a relatively cheap sanction that would nevertheless create common knowledge of the collective valuation of the rule of non-aggression (see O’Mahoney, 2011). As Stimson later pointed out, if the threat of nonrecognition did not deter the Japanese, ‘it would lay a firm foundation of principle upon which the Western nations and China could stand in a later reckoning’ (Stimson and Bundy, 1947: 258; see also 1947: 235).…”
Section: The Manchurian Crisis and The Genesis Of Nonrecognition Of Aggressive Gainmentioning
confidence: 99%