The spillover effects of different monetary incentive levels on health experts' free knowledge contribution behavior

Abstract

PurposeUnderstanding health experts' online free knowledge contribution behavior is vital for promoting health knowledge and improving health literacy. This study focuses on the spillover effects of different monetary incentive levels on health experts' free knowledge contribution behavior.Design/methodology/approachIn 2016, Zhihu Live and Zhi Hu were launched as two types of paid knowledge products on Zhihu.com, a hybrid knowledge exchange platform. Focusing on the policy impact of launching Zhihu Live and Zhi Hu, this study uses the difference-in-differences model to analyze the heterogeneous spillover effects of high-yield and low-yield monetary incentives on health experts' free knowledge contribution behavior.FindingsIn the short term, the high-yield monetary incentive has positive spillover effects on the quantity and quality of free knowledge contribution while the low-yield monetary incentive generates opposite effects. In the long term, the effects of the high-yield monetary incentive remain significantly positive. The effect of the low-yield monetary incentive on the quantity of free knowledge contribution remains significantly negative, but its effect on the quality of free knowledge contribution is not significant.Originality/valueThis study combines theories of reciprocity and resource limitation to study the spillover effects of different monetary incentive levels on health experts' online behavior. The short-term and long-term effects of different monetary incentive levels on health experts' online behavior are also explored.

Monetary income as opportunity cost: exploring the negative effect on free knowledge contribution of knowledge suppliers

“…In 2011, Zhihu was initially built as a free knowledge-sharing platform. By 2016, facing the developing trend of knowledge payment, Zhihu launched paid knowledge services to monetize online knowledge, named Zhihu Live (Live Session) and Zhi Hu (Paid consultation), transforming to HKSPs (Qi et al , 2021). By December 31, 2020, the annual revenue of Zhihu reached RMB 1.352bn, with a year-on-year rise of 101.7% [1].…”

“…In detail, knowledge suppliers can actively post articles or reactively answer questions with or without payment (Mahr and Lievens, 2012). One typical example of HKSPs is Zhihu (China), which mainly supported free Q&A activities, launched Zhihu Live (a kind of paid knowledge activity) in 2016 so that knowledge suppliers can hold live talks and charge listeners for entrance fees (Qi et al , 2021). Statistics show that the market of paid knowledge activities in China will reach RMB 112.65bn in 2022, which is expected to increase to RMB 180.27bn in 2023 (iiMedia, 2022).…”

“…Since monetary incentives target to motivate paid knowledge contribution, they may also have a spillover effect on free knowledge contribution. While some research studies prove the positive spillover effects (Kuang et al , 2019; Qi et al , 2021), others found that the provision of monetary incentives negatively impact users’ prosocial behaviors (Lombardi et al , 2020). In the context of online review, Qiao et al (2020) found that reviewers who have been rewarded will reduce efforts in subsequent free review contributions.…”

“…This study aims at addressing this research gap by examining the direct influence of the amount of monetary income, while few studies considered the quantity dimension of monetary income (Qi et al, 2021). Third, by including two contextual factors in HKSPs (i.e.…”

“…However, since free knowledge contribution has a good drainage effect on attracting new users (Qi et al , 2021), a potential concern for HKSPs operators is whether introducing paid knowledge activities influences free knowledge contribution. For practice, this question is important to be figured out for the survival of HKSPs depending on the cocontribution to both free and paid knowledge activities.…”