The Sphere of Experience in Locke

Abstract

Locke endorses a distinction between passive reflection and voluntary attentive reflection, which he occasionally labels contemplation. Failure to recognize this distinction properly has had an effect on interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection, and caused puzzlement about the relation between reflection and consciousness. In particular, the function of reflection as a passive internal sense that produces simple ideas of mental operations has been downplayed in favour of the view that reflection in one manner or another involves attention and/or presupposes con-sciousness of mental operations. This has led a number of scholars to maintain, implicitly or explicitly, that Locke in fact abandons either his doctrine of sensation and reflection as the two exclusive sources of ideas or his doctrine of ideas as the only immediate objects of experience. According to one reading, ideas of mental operations are produced by virtue of consciousness, and reflection is assigned the role of forming definite ideas. This conflicts with Locke’s official doctrine of sensation and reflection as the only origins of ideas. According to another reading, ideas are not at all involved in our direct consciousness of mental operations, but the production of ideas through reflection is preconditioned by this primary consciousness. This means introducing immediate objects of experience that are not ideas, which conflicts with Locke’s commitment to ideas as the only immediate objects of all kinds of thinking.

Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance?

“…More recently, see Coventry and Kriegel (2008), Lähteenmäki (2008;, Jorgensen (2010), Thiel (2011), LoLordo (2012), Weinberg (2008;2016a Existence and Unity, are two other Ideas, that are suggested to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have Existence: And whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real Being, or Idea, suggests to the Understanding, the Idea of Unity.…”

“…A number of recent interpretations, although differing in details, agree that, for Locke, consciousness is a constituent, or ingredient, of the mental state that is the perception of an idea. SeeCoventry and Kriegel (2008),Lähteenmäki (2008;,Jorgensen (2010),Thiel (2011), LoLordo (2012), Weinberg (20082016a).14Wolterstorff (1996: 14) seems to allow the same when he says, 'Locke rather often speaks of the mind as being directly acquainted with its own 'operations' (for example in II,i,4 and II,I,8); and he doesn't count the mind's operations among its ideas.' This is not, by any means however, an uncontroversial view.…”