The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: March-April 1973

Kelly, Anne M.

doi:10.21236/ad0780592

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…A year after the invasion of Tunbs and Abu Musa, the restriction on Iranian arms purchases was effectively removed, which let the Shah purchase anything he wanted short of nuclear weapons (Shlaim 1995: 63) 30 From the US point of view, the successful invasion was a manifestation of Iran's reliability as a partner, not a threat to the region's security (Alvandi 2012: 365-6 (Fukuyama, 1980). Indeed, the Soviet Union scaled up military assistance before and after the 1973 border crisis, and provided diplomatic support by giving "moral support" and paying a "friendship" visit by Admiral Gorshkov and a contingent of naval ships (Kelly, 1974).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Iraq, Iranian units fought in the Iraqi forces supporting the Kurdish resistance, and the Shah showed little hesitancy in escalating tensions with Iraq over the disputed Shatt-al waterway until Saddam Hussein finally gave in by signing the 1975 Algier Agreement.While a full elaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, Iraq's foreign policy behavior at this time also appears to conform to our theoretical expectation, especially toward neighboring Kuwait. In March 1973, Iraq attacked the Kuwaiti border post of Al-Samitah and claimed the islands of Warba and Bubiyan, as part of efforts to fortify the geostrategically significant port and naval base of Umm Qasr(Kelly, 1974). While several factors accounted for the decision to escalate the border dispute with Kuwait, the fact that the Soviet Union-Iraq security ties were strong in 1973 following the conclusion of theTreaty of Friendship and Cooperation in April 1972 created a particularly favorable strategic environment for Iraq.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression

Kim

Woods

2016

int stud perspect

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What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the regime type of petrostates has significant effects on a likelihood of petrostates launching revisionist MIDs While domestic politics is an important factor that explains the motivation and behavioral patterns of a petrostate, it says little about the international environment under which a petrostate decides to initiate conflicts. Petro-aggression does not take place devoid of concerns for the possible international backlash that its aggression could inflict on itself. One significant factor that presents opportunities and constraints for petro-aggression is a great power alliance. In essence, the great power has strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons, and hence tends not to oppose military adventurism by its ally. Consequently, the petrostate's anticipation of great power inaction or even protection for its revisionist policy creates a moral hazard problem. Overall, by offering favorable circumstances, a great power alliance has a positive effect on petro-aggression. Although not without caveats, our large-n model and case study bear out this conclusion.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression

Kim

Woods

2016

int stud perspect

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“…This is an Australian trade union, which was (according to their website) requested by NZ actors in 2006 to set up an office in NZ. According to Helen Kelly, President of the Council of Trade Unions (CTU -NZ's peak trade union body), the membership of NZ Equity at April 2011 was around 600 (Kelly, 2011).…”

Section: The Background To the Disputementioning

confidence: 99%

‘The Hobbit Dispute’: Organizing Through Transnational Alliances

Jess

2014

GLJ

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It is now seen as a common sense strategy for trade unions to organise at a transnational level, in order to attempt to counter the global nature of capital in the neo-liberal political economy. Events surrounding the controversy over the location of the production of the two Hobbit movies in New Zealand in 2010 highlight how the forces of labour remain embedded in the nation state. This location of labour within the institutions, history and culture of particular nations, combined with a non-neutral state actor, can negate the power of transnational alliances, leaving labour powerless against threats of capital flight. This paper will seek to explore the transnational strategy adopted by the actors' Global Union Federation (GUF), the International Federation of Actors (FIA). In doing so, it will use the framework for analysis of such alliances suggested by Brookes (2013). It will also attempt to explain how a brief two-week period in New Zealand (NZ) industrial relations has come to be seen as a failure of trade unionism and global action, even while the objective of that action, collective bargaining, was achieved.

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“…In 1973 Soviet pressure contributed to Iraq's agreement to enter into negotiations with Kuwait after its attack on a Kuwaiti border post. 1 However, the Soviets did not prevent the Iraqi attack itself in 1973, nor did they prevent Iraq's attack of Iran in 1980. In fact, Soviet attempts at crisis prevention in the Middle East have generally met with failure.…”

Section: Flemingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capabilities and objectives in the gulf crisis

Fleming¹

1991

Int J Polit Cult Soc

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The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: March-April 1973

Cited by 8 publications

References 27 publications

Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression

Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression

‘The Hobbit Dispute’: Organizing Through Transnational Alliances

Capabilities and objectives in the gulf crisis

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