The South China Sea Arbitration: Bindingness, Finality, and Compliance with UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Decisions

Abstract

On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal in theSouth China Seaarbitration issued its final award. China rejected the ruling as “null and void”. The Philippines dismissed it as “a piece of paper” after initially hailing the ruling a “milestone decision”. The reactions of the parties concerned raise important questions about the bindingness, finality, and state compliance with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions. This paper addresses these questions by dissecting China’s arguments that the award “has no binding force” and by examining the options available for promoting compliance with the award. The paper also considers the broader question of how states generally comply with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions and evaluates the significance of UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms, including theSouth China Seaarbitration, in the absence of external enforcement.

How Does Language and Culture Form One Unique National Identity? A Case Study of Renaming the South China Sea to North Natuna Sea in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Since 2016

“…However, most non-Chinese scholars conclude that China's historical claims are weak due to a lack of solid records (Wang, 2015). In addition, the international community has rejected the nine-dash line, including the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which ruled in 2016 that China's claims in the South China Sea were inconsistent with the UNCLOS (Phan & Nguyen 2018). UNCLOS itself regulates the boundaries of maritime sovereignty between countries in the concept of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which are 200 miles from the outer border of the territorial sea, and China ratified the UNCLOS in 1996 (Jinming & Dexia 2003).…”

“…On the other hand, long before the concept of sovereignty was created and upheld, people were used to trade and interact without worrying about sovereignty matters (Wang 2015). Additionally, in the modern era, namely after 2016, the international community has highlighted the claim and believes that the nine-dash line is not in accordance with UNCLOS as the primary reference for upholding sovereignty in the sea area (Phan & Nguyen, 2018;Strating 2022).…”

Facing the Ravenous Sea Dragon: How Weaker Nations Confront Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea

“…Weaker SCS claimants respond to China by aligning with other states (mainly the U.S.) and enhancing their own defense capabilities (Borton, 2015;Fravel, 2015;Carlyle A. Thayer, 2016;Harold et al, 2019). They have also harnessed the power of international laws and rules, particularly the Tribunal case (2013)(2014)(2015)(2016) won by the Philippines against China (Schofield, 2016;Phan & Nguyen, 2017;Vitug, 2018). But their efforts have likely failed to prevent China from escalating its expansionism and coercion in the long term.…”

Classification of Maritime Disputes and Modern Legal Means of their Resolution

“…Американский юрист Томас Шенбаум (Thomas J. Schoenbaum) отмечает, что Арбитражный трибунал, учрежденный в соответствии с UNCLOS для рассмотрения исков Филиппин к КНР в Южно-Китайском море, «подтверждает и усиливает свободу судоходства в океанских районах и права прибрежных государств» [59, p. 290], и вместе с тем Шенбаум признает, что односторонние решения суда «вряд ли будут способствовать разрешению опасных споров в Южно-Китайском море» [59, p. 290]. Исследования Л. Н. Нгуен (Lan Ngoc Nguyen) в Утрехтском университете (Нидерланды) подтверждают, что в настоящее время Азия является ареной самых принципиальных морских споров [43], и отмечают, что в отсутствие внешнего принуждения государства в целом соблюдают решения по урегулированию споров UNCLOS, однако решения арбитража по делимитации Южно-Китайского моря не считаются сторонами споров обязательными [49].…”