The Social Motivation Hypothesis for Prosocial Behavior

Abstract

Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favor of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden's fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right but also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g., fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications of the social motivation hypothesis on existing modeling practice.

How does it really feel to act together? Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency

“…Nevertheless, individuals who engaged in synchronous behavior reported greater feelings of interpersonal connectedness, rapport, and affiliation, and they sometimes cooperated more in social dilemma situations than people in asynchronous conditions (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). This suggests that behavioral synchrony constitutes a basic building block for our daily interactions with others, and the inherently rewarding aspect of such behaviors explains why we are prima facie motivated to participate in joint actions that involve aspects of synchrony (Godman 2013;Godman et al 2014).…”

“…Researchers instead focus on mechanisms of action specification and control that make joint action more complex than individual action, and on the implications of these demands for the sense of agency and control in joint action. In contrast to this cognitive approach, ours highlights the central roles affective rewards (Godman 2013) play in creating the sense of we-agency, and the underlying motivational structures of joint action (Godman et al 2014). This allows us to develop an account of the sense of agency for joint action, 1 in which Pacherie's (2014) two senses of agency for joint action, namely, Ba sense of agency for joint outcomes^and B a sense of we-agency^are integrated.…”

Alzheimer's Disease and Relationships of Value

“…With colleagues Michiru Nagatsu and Mikko Salmela, I have therefore argued that the intrinsic rewards of social interactions and relationships are what allows for cooperation and joint goals in the first place (Godman et al 2014). For example, we argue that social motivations (e.g.…”

What Does It Take to Be a Social Agent?

“…Several authors argue that many types of prosocial behavior depend on individualist and selfish inclinations, so they are oriented, for instance, to protect individual reputation [15]. However, it can be argued [16,17] that, although the reputation management mechanism is a strong source of motivation, it can hardly be a general explanation for prosocial tendencies. Moreover, it is doubtful that reputation management could be developmentally prior to general dispositions to engage in positively valenced interactions with other people within a framework of long-lasting concern for each other's welfare [16].…”