How does it really feel to act together? Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency

Abstract

Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie's (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 25-46, 2014) account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely (1) the necessary trade-off between the sense of self-and weagency; and (2) the lack of affective phenomenology of joint action in general. After elaborating on these criticisms based on our theory of shared emotion, we substantiate the second criticism by discussing different mechanisms of shared affect-feelings and emotions-that are present in typical joint actions. We show that our account improves on Pacherie's, first by introducing our agentive model of we-agency to overcome her unnecessary dichotomy between a sense of self-and we-agency, and then by suggesting that the mechanisms of shared affect enhance not only the predictability of other agents' actions as Pacherie highlights, but also an agentive sense of we-agency that emerges from shared emotions experienced in the course and consequence of joint action.

On the Awareness of Joint Agency: A Pessimistic Account of the Feelings of Acting Together

“…Suppose Bobo and Coco are rowing a boat together; Bobo on the starboard side, and Coco on the port side. There might be diverse and varied experiences that Bobo or Coco could appeal to when they are rowing jointly, for example, “the flavor of togetherness” (Tollefsen, Kreuz, and Dale ), “the sense of coordination” (Michael ), or “sense of We‐Agency” (Salmela and Nagatsu , ). What is the basis for assuming this?…”

“…One view is the shared emotions or shared feelings view of the phenomenology of joint action (Michael ; Michael and Pacherie , 107; Salmela and Nagatsu , ). 5 John Michael () discusses four different ways in which shared emotions may be a minimal basis for joint actions: emotion detection, emotion contagion, empathy, and emotional rapport.…”

“…One benefit of Salmela and Nagatsu's recent account (2016, 2017) is that these three worries do not apply to that account of shared emotions as a basis for the awareness of joint agency. Salmela and Nagatsu () present an account of shared emotions as the basis for an account of how it feels to act together. If a holder and a kicker are kicking a field goal, then according to Salmela and Nagatsu, an awareness of we‐agency would involve a sense of “sharing the same fate” or “being in the same boat.” Co‐agents of a task of sending the ball through the uprights—Lucy Van Pelt and Charlie Brown—share a joint goal and engage interdependently to ensure that coordination between bodily movements gives rise to cooperation.…”

“…Another benefit of the agentive account is that it does not presuppose empathy or rapport in order for that evaluative content to be shared. Instead, it relies on basic causal mechanisms of behavioral synchrony—for instance, emotional contagion, facial mimicry, motor mimicry, imitation, and neural mirroring (Salmela and Nagatsu , 460–61). However, Salmela and Nagatsu add collective effervescence and fellow‐feeling to the account (2017, 461–65).…”

“…What is it like for Hillary to engage in the action of seesawing together in these two cases? I suggest that the myopic focus on the experience of control ignores the affective components of the awareness of joint agency (Salmela and Nagatsu , ). In addition, even those views that focus on the affective life of cooperation leave out the tendency to feel the pain of not getting along, the emotions of fear, anger, sadness, and disgust, and the negative sentiments we feel when we are coerced, or taken advantage of, or totally abandoned in a cooperative project.…”