The Small Improvement Argument, Epistemicism and Incomparability

Flanigan, Edmund Tweedy; Halstead, John

doi:10.1017/s0266267118000019

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Nebel (2018) states instances of Strong Monotonicity for 'good' and 'bad' and observes that they pose problems for incomparability in specific contexts, but fails to notice their more general implications; we thank Michael Rabenberg for first bringing them to our attention. Flanigan and Halstead (2018) propose a similar "dyadic-monadic" principle to defend the more limited claim that, given epistemicism about vagueness, options must be comparable. Gustafsson (2020) rejects Strong Monotonicity for 'good', precisely because it is incompatible with incomparability given further axiological assumptions; see also Thornley (forthcoming).…”

Section: Incomparability-connectedness and Strong Monotonicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The case for comparability

Dorr

Nebel

Zuehl

2022

Nous

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We argue that all comparative expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x$x$ and y$y$ are at least as F$F$ as themselves, then either x$x$ is at least as F$F$ as y$y$ or y$y$ is at least as F$F$ as x$x$. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns of inference that seem manifestly valid, that the purported failures of Comparability would have absurd consequences, and that the influential arguments against Comparability are less compelling than they may have initially seemed.

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Section: Incomparability-connectedness and Strong Monotonicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The case for comparability

Dorr

Nebel

Zuehl

2022

Nous

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“…This is the view I will defend. Flanigan and Halstead (2018) develop a view closely related to both epistemism and indeterminism. On their view, evaluative comparisons are vague, and this is what accounts for the appearance of value incommensurability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemicism and commensurability

Forrester

2022

Inquiry

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The topic for this paper is the apparent value incommensurabilitytwo goods are apparently incommensurable when it appears that neither is better than the other nor are they equally good. I consider three theories of this phenomenon. Indeterminists like Broome [Broome, John. 1997. "Is Incommensurability Vagueness?" In Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang. Harvard University Press.] hold that it is due to vagueness: when two goods appear to be incommensurable, this owes to the fact that 'better than' is vague. Incommensurabilists like Chang [Chang, Ruth. 2002. "The Possibility of Parity." Ethics 112 (4): 659-688.] hold that some goods appear to be incommensurable because they genuinely are, because it is determinate that neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. I defend epistemicism, the view that the appearance of value incommensurability is due only to our ignorance of how goods compare. In reality, all goods are commensurable. I offer two arguments for epistemicism. First, epistemicists are committed to less unexplained axiological structure than are non-epistemicists, Second, only epistemicists have an adequate explanation of some facts about the scope of apparent incommensurability. Finally, I identify a class of putative counterexamples to the epistemicist's analysis..

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“…In cases where (1) to ( 3) hold, we need to establish that x and 5 The argument has its antecedents in Leonard Savage's classic, The Foundations of Statistics (1954, 17). It can also be found in De Sousa (1974), Raz (1986, 332-35), Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, 66), Espinoza (2008), Gustafsson and Espinoza (2010), Carlson (2011), Gustafsson (2013), Andreou (2015), Anderson (2015), Flanigan and Halstead (2018), among others. See also chapter 5 for a systematic analysis of this argument.…”

Section: Are Hard Choices Cases Of Parity?mentioning

confidence: 91%

“…4 And of course, it is easy to see why. For we have already established that a situation constitutes a hard choice when, and only when, an agent cannot op-2 See, inter alia, De Sousa (1974) Raz (1986, 332-35), Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, 66), Chang (1997Chang ( , 2002bChang ( , 2012Chang ( , 2017, Regan (1997), Qizilbash (2002), Gert (2004), Wasserman (2004), Hsieh (2007Hsieh ( , 2016, Carlson (2011), Peterson (2006), Espinoza (2008), Rabinowicz (2008Rabinowicz ( , 2012, (Boot, 2009), Gustafsson and Espinoza (2010), Gustafsson (2013), Anderson (2015), Andreou (2015), Flanigan and Halstead (2018). It also makes an appearance in other areas of practical philosophy, like the analysis of the money-pump argument (Gustafsson, 2016); or the investigation of the existence of supererogatory acts (Muñoz, 2021).…”

Section: Characterizations Without Transitivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

What is a Hard Choice?

Jitendranath

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The title of this thesis is also its question: what is a hard choice? I start addressing this in chapter 1 by arguing that at the most general level, a hard choice is a situation that condemns an agent to failure. Specifically, hard choices condemn an agent to failure because rational agents must act in a way that can be justified, but they cannot do so when facing a hard choice. They cannot do so because, in a hard choice, an agent's given reasons for action will fail to determine what, all things considered, the agent ought to do. Subsequent chapters of this thesis develops this view in more detail. Chapter 1* presents the formal framework that will be used in this thesis. It argues that there is an important sense in which the standard theory of rational choice needs to be reformulated in order to present a sound theory of hard choices. Chapter 2 argues that leading positions on hard choices that can be found in the literature provide an inadequate understanding of them. The argument presented to defend my claims will refer directly or indirectly to the fairly intuitive idea that a situation where a best---or optimal---alternative exists does not constitute a hard choice. That is, optimization implies rationality. Chapter 3 asks the converse: does rationality imply optimization? The chapter defends two claims. First, if you cannot optimize because of incompleteness of the binary preference or value relation that you hold, then you are facing a hard choice. Second, if you cannot optimize because the binary preference or value relation that you hold is cyclic, then you are not facing a hard choice. Chapter 4 doubles down on this claim by characterizing this understanding of a hard choice. More specifically, chapter 4 presents a systematic analysis of the axiomatic structure of hard choices with the help of the theory of rational choice. This is the most formal chapter of the thesis, and it presents joint work undertaken with Prof. Martin van Hees and Dr. Roland Luttens. Chapter 5 also presents joint work with Prof. Martin van Hees and Dr. Roland Luttens. This chapter scrutinizes the most famous existence argument for hard choices, to wit: the small-improvement argument, and argues that it fails to establish the existence of hard choices. Chapter 6 will be concerned with extending the analysis of hard choices that has been presented in the preceding chapters. Specifically, observe that the claims in the preceding chapters have been articulated and defended by presupposing the existence of an all things considered binary relation that describes an agent's preferences or values. Chapter 6, however, will present an analysis of hard choices that does not require presupposing such a binary relation. A Coda motivates the possibility of another extension: collective hard choices.

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The Small Improvement Argument, Epistemicism and Incomparability

Cited by 5 publications

References 24 publications

The case for comparability

The case for comparability

Epistemicism and commensurability

What is a Hard Choice?

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