Epistemicism and commensurability

Abstract

The topic for this paper is the apparent value incommensurabilitytwo goods are apparently incommensurable when it appears that neither is better than the other nor are they equally good. I consider three theories of this phenomenon. Indeterminists like Broome [Broome, John. 1997. "Is Incommensurability Vagueness?" In Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang. Harvard University Press.] hold that it is due to vagueness: when two goods appear to be incommensurable, this owes to the fact that 'better than' is vague. Incommensurabilists like Chang [Chang, Ruth. 2002. "The Possibility of Parity." Ethics 112 (4): 659-688.] hold that some goods appear to be incommensurable because they genuinely are, because it is determinate that neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. I defend epistemicism, the view that the appearance of value incommensurability is due only to our ignorance of how goods compare. In reality, all goods are commensurable. I offer two arguments for epistemicism. First, epistemicists are committed to less unexplained axiological structure than are non-epistemicists, Second, only epistemicists have an adequate explanation of some facts about the scope of apparent incommensurability. Finally, I identify a class of putative counterexamples to the epistemicist's analysis..