The shaping of social perception by stimulus and knowledge cues to human animacy

Abstract

Although robots are becoming an ever-growing presence in society, we do not hold the same expectations for robots as we do for humans, nor do we treat them the same. As such, the ability to recognize cues to human animacy is fundamental for guiding social interactions. We review literature that demonstrates cortical networks associated with person perception, action observation and mentalizing are sensitive to human animacy information. In addition, we show that most prior research has explored stimulus properties of artificial agents (humanness of appearance or motion), with less investigation into knowledge cues (whether an agent is believed to have human or artificial origins). Therefore, currently little is known about the relationship between stimulus and knowledge cues to human animacy in terms of cognitive and brain mechanisms. Using fMRI, an elaborate belief manipulation, and human and robot avatars, we found that knowledge cues to human animacy modulate engagement of person perception and mentalizing networks, while stimulus cues to human animacy had less impact on social brain networks. These findings demonstrate that self–other similarities are not only grounded in physical features but are also shaped by prior knowledge. More broadly, as artificial agents fulfil increasingly social roles, a challenge for roboticists will be to manage the impact of pre-conceived beliefs while optimizing human-like design.

From automata to animate beings: the scope and limits of attributing socialness to artificial agents

“…Crucially, the attribution of socialness is an ongoing, dynamic process between the perceived agent and the observing agent, and is composed of many cues . Some of these cues are derived from features of the artificial agent, such as its form and motion, and are referred to as bottom‐up or stimulus cues to socialness.…”

The attribution of animacy and agency in frontotemporal dementia versus Alzheimer's disease

“…Animacy and agency determination does not require visual face and body cues to living status, and may be elicited by cognitive interpretation of moving geometric shapes as “agents like me” (Cross, Ramsey, Liepelt, Prinz, & de, 2016; Frith & Frith, 2010; Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010). Furthermore, the attribution of animacy from these geometric shapes allows for inferences about goals, intentions, and personality characteristics and permits subsequent mechanisms of social cognition, such as mentalizing and empathy (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Santos et al, 2010; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).…”

“…The right IFG, along with the right parietal region, may be associated with subjective reports of animacy experience (Santos et al, 2010). An increase in right IFG activity may occur if there is a need to reconcile animate versus inanimate features of shapes (Cross et al, 2016), and in achieving interbrain synchronization through the fronto-parietal mirror neuron network (Liu, Saito, & Oi, 2015; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown bilateral activation of the IFG and frontal operculum, as well as inferior parietal areas, on viewing Heider and Simmel or comparable tasks, compared to non-social or random movements (Gobbini et al, 2007).…”

Theory of mind and its neural mechanisms: A case study of Kurdish-Persian congenitally blind children in Ilam city

“…Many separate brain circuits are responsible for the process of social understanding. Three of which particularly the theory of mind network (the medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC), TemporoParietal Junction (TPJ), temporal poles and precuneus (7,8) and the mirror neuron system (Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and Inferior Parietal Lobe (IPL)) (12,9). However, the neural regions of the theory of mind are not limited to the mentioned regions (10).…”