The joint go-nogo Simon effect (social Simon effect, or joint cSE) has been considered as an index of automatic action/task co-representation. Recent findings, however, challenge extreme versions of this social co-representation account by suggesting that the (joint) cSE results from any sufficiently salient event that provides a reference for spatially coding one's own action. By manipulating the salient nature of reference-providing events in an auditory go-nogo Simon task, the present study indeed demonstrates that spatial reference events do not necessarily require social (Experiment 1) or movement features (Experiment 2) to induce action coding. As long as events attract attention in a bottom-up fashion (e.g., auditory rhythmic features; Experiment 3 and 4), events in an auditory go-nogo Simon task seem to be co-represented irrespective of the agent or object producing these events. This suggests that the cSE does not necessarily imply the co-representation of tasks. The theory of event coding provides a comprehensive account of the available evidence on the cSE: the presence of another salient event requires distinguishing the cognitive representation of one's own action from the representation of other events, which can be achieved by referential coding-the spatial coding of one's action relative to the other events.

In the standard Simon task, participants carry out spatially defined responses to non-spatial stimulus attributes. Responses are typically faster when stimulus location and response location correspond. This effect disappears when a participant responds to only one of the two stimuli and reappears when another person carries out the other response. This social Simon effect (SSE) has been considered as providing an index for action co-representation. Here, we investigated whether joint-action effects in a social Simon task involve mechanisms of action co-representation, as measured by the amount of incorporation of another person's action. We combined an auditory social Simon task with a manipulation of the sense of ownership of another person's hand (rubber hand illusion). If the SSE is established by action co-representation, then the incorporation of the other person's hand into one's own body representation should increase the SSE (synchronous > asynchronous stroking). However, we found the SSE to be smaller in the synchronous as compared to the asynchronous stroking condition (Experiment 1), suggesting that the SSE reflects the separation of spatial action events rather than the integration of the other person's action. This effect is independent of the active involvement (Experiment 2) and the presence of another person (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that the “social” Simon effect is not really social in nature but is established when an interaction partner produces events that serve as a spatial reference for one's own actions.

The social or joint Simon effect has been developed to investigate how and to what extent people mentally represent their own and other persons' action/task and how these cognitive representations influence an individual's own behavior when interacting with another person. Here, we provide a review of the available evidence and theoretical frameworks. Based on this review, we suggest a comprehensive theory that integrates aspects of earlier approaches–the Referential Coding Account. This account provides an alternative to the social interpretation of the (joint) go-nogo Simon effect (aka the social Simon effect) and is able to integrate seemingly opposite findings on joint action.

As humans, we gather a wide range of information about other people from watching them move. A network of parietal, premotor, and occipitotemporal regions within the human brain, termed the action observation network (AON), has been implicated in understanding others' actions by means of an automatic matching process that links observed and performed actions. Current views of the AON assume a matching process biased towards familiar actions; specifically, those performed by conspecifics and present in the observer's motor repertoire. In this study, we test how this network responds to form and motion cues when observing natural human motion compared to rigid robotic-like motion across two independent functional neuroimaging experiments. In Experiment 1, we report the surprising finding that premotor, parietal, occipitotemporal regions respond more robustly to rigid, robot-like motion than natural human motion. In Experiment 2, we replicate and extend this finding by demonstrating that the same pattern of results emerges whether the agent is a human or a robot, which suggests the preferential response to robot-like motion is independent of the agent's form. These data challenge previous ideas about AON function by demonstrating that the core nodes of this network can be flexibly engaged by novel, unfamiliar actions performed by both human and non-human agents. As such, these findings suggest that the AON is sensitive to a broader range of action features beyond those that are simply familiar.

Abstract. There is recent evidence that we directly map observed actions of other agents onto our own motor repertoire, referred to as direct matching (Iacoboni et al., 1999). This was shown when we are actively engaged in joint action with others' (Sebanz et al. 2003) and also when observing irrelevant movements while executing congruent or incongruent movements (Brass et al., 2000). However, an open question is whether direct matching in human beings is limited to the perception of intentional agents. Recent research provides contradictory evidence with respect to the question whether the direct matching system has a biological bias possibly emerging from perceptual differences of the stimulus display. In this study all participants performed a motor priming task observing the identical animation showing finger lifting movements of a hand in a leather glove. Before running the experiment we presented either a human hand or a wooden analog hand wearing the leather glove. We found a motor priming effect for both human and wooden hands. However, motor priming was larger when participants believed that they interacted with a human hand than when they believed to interact with a wooden hand. The stronger motor priming effect for the biological agent suggests that the ''direct matching system'' is tuned to represent actions of animate agents.

The mirror system, comprising cortical areas that allow the actions of others to be represented in the observer's own motor system, is thought to be crucial for the development of social cognition in humans. Despite the importance of the human mirror system, little is known about its origins. We investigated the role of sensorimotor experience in the development of the mirror system. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to measure neural responses to observed hand and foot actions following one of two types of training. During training, participants in the Compatible (control) group made mirror responses to observed actions (hand responses were made to hand stimuli and foot responses to foot stimuli), whereas the Incompatible group made counter-mirror responses (hand to foot and foot to hand). Comparison of these groups revealed that, after training to respond in a counter-mirror fashion, the relative action observation properties of the mirror system were reversed; areas that showed greater responses to observation of hand actions in the Compatible group responded more strongly to observation of foot actions in the Incompatible group. These results suggest that, rather than being innate or the product of unimodal visual or motor experience, the mirror properties of the mirror system are acquired through sensorimotor learning

In human-human interactions co-representing a partner's actions is crucial to successfully adjust and coordinate actions with others. Current research suggests that action co-representation is restricted to interactions between human agents facilitating social interaction with conspecifics. In the present study, we investigated whether action co-representation, as measured by the Social Simon Effect (SSE), is present when we share a task with a real humanoid robot. Further, we tested if the believed humanness of the robot's functional principle modulates the extent to which robotic actions are co-represented. We described the robot to participants either as functioning in a biologically inspired human-like way or in a purely deterministic machine-like manner. The SSE was present in the human-like, but not in the machinelike robot condition. The present findings suggest that humans co-represent the actions of non-biological robotic agents when they start to attribute human-like cognitive processes to the robot. Our findings provide novel evidence for top-down modulation effects on action co-representation in human-robot interaction situations.Words: 161

This study examines whether an improved intertask coordination skill is acquired during extensive dualtask training and whether it can be transferred to a new dual-task situation. Participants practised a visual-manual task and an auditory-vocal task. These tasks were trained in two groups matched in dual-task performance measures before practice: a single-task practice group and a hybrid practice group (including single-task and dual-task practice). After practice, the single-task practice group was transferred to the same dual-task situation as that for the hybrid practice group (Experiment 1), both groups were transferred to a dual-task situation with a new visual task (Experiment 2), and both groups were transferred to a dual-task situation with a new auditory task matched in task difficulty (Experiment 3). The results show a dual-task performance advantage in the hybrid practice group over the single-task practice group in the practised dual-task situation (Experiment 1), the manipulated visual-task situation (Experiment 2), and the manipulated auditory-task situation (Experiment 3). In all experiments, the dual-task performance advantage was consistently found for the auditory task only. These findings suggest that extended dual-task practice improves the skill to coordinate two tasks, which may be defined as an accelerated switching operation between both tasks. This skill is relatively robust against changes of the component visual and auditory tasks. We discuss how the finding of task coordination could be integrated in present models of dual-task research.