The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria

Gugler, Klaus; Kalss, Susanne; Stomper, Alex; Zechner, Josef

doi:10.1093/0199257531.003.0002

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…This central position of the Austrian state in the control and strategy of the largest companies goes back to the Nationalisation Acts of 1946 and 1947. In 1989, the Austrian state was the largest domestic shareholder of the corporations listed on the stock exchange, holding 37.3 of the shares (Gugler et al 2001;Jud 1994: 473).…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similar to Switzerland, the concentration of ownership was particularly strong in Austria. By international standards, Austria seems to be the European country with the highest ownership concentration (Gugler et al 2001). This concentration was strengthened by the existence of the state-owned holding (OIAG created in 1970) and the practice of "pyramiding" (mainly by banks), which allowed for the extension of control at a relatively low cost (Kurzer 1993: chap.…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This concentration was strengthened by the existence of the state-owned holding (OIAG created in 1970) and the practice of "pyramiding" (mainly by banks), which allowed for the extension of control at a relatively low cost (Kurzer 1993: chap. 4;Gugler et al 2001). In its heyday in 1975, the OIAG group counted 120,000 employees (approximately 18 of all persons employed in industry).…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Changing Political Economies of Small West European Countries

Becker¹

2011

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Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Corporate Governance and Economic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Changing Political Economies of Small West European Countries

Becker¹

2011

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“…Becht and Röell (1999) provide a summary of the main findings of this network. For individual country studies see Becht and Böhmer (1999), , Bianchi et al (1999), Bloch and Kremp (1999), Crespí-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona (1999), De Jong et al (1999), Goergen and Renneborg (1999) and Gugler et al (1999).…”

Section: Ownership Structure and Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Köhler

2009

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08110.pdf Non-Technical SummaryOwnership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. Das Wichtigste in Kürze Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector Matthias Köhler Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)December 2008 Abstract:Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe.

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“…provide a summary of the main findings of this network. For individual country studies seeBecht and Böhmer (1999);;Bianchi et al (1999);Bloch and Kremp (1999); Crespí-Cladera andGarcia-Cestona (1999);De Jong et al (1999),Goergen and Renneboog (1999);Gugler et al (1999).…”

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confidence: 99%

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

Köhler

2010

Eur J Law Econ

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This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.

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The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

The Changing Political Economies of Small West European Countries

The Changing Political Economies of Small West European Countries

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

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