2010
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9174-y
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Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

Abstract: This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 32 publications
(47 reference statements)
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“…We consider shareholders with less than 10% of voting rights to be a null value, following Laeven and Levine (2009). According to Köhler (2010), the mean of United Kingdom (UK) voting rights is lower when comparing with Continental Europe [8], mainly due to the protection of shareholders' rights in UK, where large shareholders do not need to have much control of the bank to be able to control the management decisions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We consider shareholders with less than 10% of voting rights to be a null value, following Laeven and Levine (2009). According to Köhler (2010), the mean of United Kingdom (UK) voting rights is lower when comparing with Continental Europe [8], mainly due to the protection of shareholders' rights in UK, where large shareholders do not need to have much control of the bank to be able to control the management decisions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…La Porta et al, (2000) argued that a better investor protection framework will reduce the need for the emergence of large shareholders to control management. The largest shareholder is defined as the largest direct or indirect stake of an individual shareholder or a group of shareholders (Köhler, 2012). Normally, large shareholders should mitigate the self-interested managerial behaviour.…”
Section: Ownership Structure and Banks` Attitude Towards Risk And Permentioning
confidence: 99%