The self and psychiatry: a conceptual history

Berríos, Germán E.; Marková, Ivana

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511543708.002

Cited by 28 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Compared to awareness of the environment, awareness of self (or self-consciousness) is an even more complex and ill-defined concept, requiring a representation of self vs other (Berrios & Markova, 2003). Bermpohl (2004, 2006) assumes self-referential processing, accounting for distinguishing stimuli related to one's own self from those that are not relevant to one's own concerns, to be at the core of the self.…”

Section: Consciousness Awareness and Wakefulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Functional connectivity in the default network during resting state is preserved in a vegetative but not in a brain dead patient

Boly¹,

Tshibanda²,

Vanhaudenhuyse³

et al. 2009

Human Brain Mapping

300

216

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The clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients (i.e., coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state) remains exceptionally challenging. Passive presentation of the patient's own name and own face are known to be effective attention-grabbing stimuli when clinically assessing consciousness at the patient's bedside. Event-related potential and functional neuroimaging studies using such self-referential stimuli are currently being used to disentangle the cognitive hierarchy of self-processing. We here review neuropsychological, neuropathological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies using the own name and own face paradigm obtained in conscious waking, sleep, pharmacological coma, pathological coma and related disorders of consciousness. Based on these results we discuss what we currently do and do not know about the functional significance of the neural network involved in ''automatic'' and ''conscious'' self-referential processing.

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Section: Consciousness Awareness and Wakefulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Functional connectivity in the default network during resting state is preserved in a vegetative but not in a brain dead patient

Boly¹,

Tshibanda²,

Vanhaudenhuyse³

et al. 2009

Human Brain Mapping

300

216

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…or in the search for biological correlates of mental states, it does not tend to examine the idea as a whole outside of the specialised field of the philosophy of psychiatry. 3 For example, the PsycINFO database has over 40 subheadings about the self, but no major subject term. More specifically, questions about what can be termed moral identity are put to one side, even when evaluative conceptions about the self appear to be at play at a clinical level, as illustrated in the opening paragraph.…”

Section: Underlying Tensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Holistic psychiatry without the whole self

Crossley

2012

Psychiatrist

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SummaryThis article considers why whole-person care is often aspired to but remains problematic for psychiatry. One reason is that psychiatry wants to use ideas about the self in restricted senses rather than examine the idea as a whole. In particular, this includes wider issues that interconnect values to identity, which then ambiguously get raised in clinical practice, such as questions about who it is good to be. This issue is the context behind unresolved boundary disputes in mental health around well-being, spirituality, self-esteem and recovery, and reflects broader cultural tensions about the making of modern identity best understood in a historical context. It has impacts on service design, therapeutics and training. Suggestions are made about how the self can be approached in psychiatric practice.

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“…This confuses two levels of inquiry: the conceptual one, where the real decisions are taken as to how the functions of the mind are to be named and classifi ed and the empirical one which is always post-hoc and all but 'confi rms' the higher level decisions. (On these complex issues, see Berrios, 1999b). 5.…”

Section: Translator's Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is an important suggestion. Until the fi rst half of the 19th century, classifi cations of madness had been based on the more botanico methodology, that is, on salient behavioural features (Berrios, 1999b;López-Piñero, 1983). Baillarger introduced as a taxonomic criterion an abstract and speculative notion.…”

Section: Translator's Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%