The Selection of Candidates for Eligible Positions on PR Lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999–2010

Put, Gert-Jan; Maddens, Bart

doi:10.1080/17457289.2012.743465

Cited by 41 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…When the dependent variable is binary (favorable versus unfavorable position), a logit model is usually chosen for estimating the coefficients. Different variations of this logic can be found in a number of studies that analyze candidate placement (e.g., Allik 2015; Górecki and Kukołowicz 2014; Kunovich 2003; Put and Maddens 2013).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

Jankowski

Marcinkiewicz

2017

Pol & Gen

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Research on the impact of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems has described quotas as ineffective or even paradoxical. While some authors argue that gender quotas without a placement mandate will be essentially ineffective since most women will be nominated to unpromising positions, others suppose that women will be disadvantaged by gender quotas because the increase in the number of female candidates will decrease the average number of preferential votes cast for women. We reexamine the evidence for these claims by analyzing the case of Poland. We demonstrate that the gender quota introduced there in 2011 increased the number of women placed at promising ballot positions and had very little impact on the number of preferential votes cast for women. Additionally, using simulations, we show that the quota had a positive impact on the number of elected women.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

Jankowski

Marcinkiewicz

2017

Pol & Gen

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“…Furthermore, 34.1 per cent are members of the executive, of which 23 per cent are aldermen (a member of the executive body) and 11.1 per cent are mayors (the head of the executive body). Previous research has shown that these local office-holders, particularly the mayors, are also more likely to be selected as realistic candidates – that is, a candidate who has a realistic chance of obtaining a seat (Put and Maddens 2013).…”

Section: The Electoral System Of Belgiummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION research has shown that these local office-holders, particularly the mayors, are also more likely to be selected as realistic candidatesthat is, a candidate who has a realistic chance of obtaining a seat (Put and Maddens 2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Municipality Size and Local Office on the Electoral Success of Belgian/Flemish Election Candidates: A Multilevel Analysis

Put

Maddens²

2014

Gov. & oppos.

Self Cite

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This article examines the effect that municipality size and local office have on election candidates’ results. We argue that candidates from the larger municipalities have comparatively larger relevant networks, both in terms of constituents and party grassroots volunteers. In addition, these candidates appeal to a relatively larger share of voters within the constituency. We expect that the relative size of the candidates’ municipality will have a positive effect on the relative number of preferential votes they receive in the constituency and will interact with the effect that holding local office has on the individual election result. While the empirical analysis does not show support for the idea that municipality size will have a significant effect, the expected interaction between local office and municipality size is confirmed. The electoral advantage of being mayor, alderman or local councillor seems to increase with the relative size of the municipality in the district.

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“…But most often, researchers rely on the judgement of the party selectorates and take the list position as a criterion for delineation. Put and Maddens (2013) define the first k positions on the list as realistic positions, where k equals the total number of seats won at the previous elections.…”

Section: Which Candidates Are Taken Into Account?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Preference Voting in the Low Countries

Wauters¹,

Thijssen²,

Erkel³

2020

Politics of the Low Countries

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Preference votes constitute one of the key features of (open and flexible) PR-list electoral systems. In this article, we give an extensive overview of studies conducted on preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands. After elaborating on the definition and delineation of preference voting, we scrutinize studies about which voters cast preference votes (demand side) and about which candidates obtain preference votes (supply side). For each of these aspects, both theoretical approaches and empirical results are discussed and compared. At the same time, we also pay attention to methodological issues in these kinds of studies. As such, this research overview reads as an ideal introduction to this topic which has repercussions on many other subfields of political science.

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The Selection of Candidates for Eligible Positions on PR Lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999–2010

Cited by 41 publications

References 23 publications

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

The Effect of Municipality Size and Local Office on the Electoral Success of Belgian/Flemish Election Candidates: A Multilevel Analysis

Preference Voting in the Low Countries

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