The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia

Abstract

Existing studies on transnational migration in Southeast Asia tend to view it primarily from labor, human rights, or gender perspectives. Few of these studies have viewed labor migration as a security problem between the countries involved. This article attempts to close this gap in the literature by looking at the case study of labor migration from Indonesia and Malaysia from a security perspective and how it affects the relationship between migrants, citizens, and governments of these two countries. The article utilizes securitization theory introduced by the Copenhagen School to explain why, within the last two decades, Malaysian politicians have shifted their treatment of Indonesian migrants from a policy of toleration to one that considers them a security threat against Malaysian society.

Globalization and Social Transformation in the Asia-Pacific

“…Cross-border migration, which arises out of poverty, political crises and military conflicts, affects security in international relations on three levels: the national security agendas of receiving and transit countries which perceive migration as a threat to the economic wellbeing, social order, cultural and religious values and political stability; the relations between states, as movements tend to create tensions and burden bilateral relations, thus impacting upon regional and international stability; and irregular migration flows might also have significant implications for individual security and dignity (Lohrmann, 2000). Arifianto (2009) argues that competition for limited jobs in host countries between domestic workers and migrants can generate a security threat by the fact that it creates tensions between nationals and migrants. Under the pretext of security, migration policies are often inhumanely applied.…”

Migration and Integration in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Australia

“…Temporary regular and irregular migration flows have increased rapidly since the 1990s not only because of changing economic conditions and increasing restrictions on access to citizenship but because of long-established informal social networks that tend to facilitate irregular migration. The most obvious examples include the long history of irregular migration between Indonesia and Malaysia (Arifianto 2009;Eilenberg 2012;Liow 2006) and between Burma and Thailand, where state capacity to control long and porous borders is limited. Weak bureaucracies and widespread corruption in developing countries also provide an environment in which irregular migration is likely to flourish, leading to widespread exploitation of migrant rights and working conditions.…”

“…Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have conducted numerous regularisation programmes (see, for instance, Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). Similarly, in Southeast Asia, Malaysia has conducted numerous regularisation programmes in order to track the extent of irregular migration from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Burma and the Philippines (Arifianto 2009;Garcés-Mascareñas 2012).…”

“…Although Emmerson (2008) now looks on democracy's advance in Southeast Asia with greater optimism, there is very little agreement within the region on cultural and political issues, which underpin processes of democratisation and governance (Jetschke & Rüland 2009;Dösch 2008a). Some of these issues include the environment, human rights and labour migration, all of which are important human security concerns (Katsumata 2009;Dösch 2008a;Arifianto 2009). Issues such as trans-border haze pollution and population movements within Southeast Asia, which can also be regarded as regional problems, also have an impact on regional integration (Caballero-Anthony 2008;Tay 2008).…”

“…Yet Malaysia's economic success is highly dependent on migrant labour, and Indonesians constitute approximately 65 per cent of all low-wage migrants in Malaysia (Chin 2008: 290). In this regard, Malaysia has a record of mistreating Indonesian migrant workers, and many Indonesians resent Malaysia's policies towards Indonesian workers (Arifianto 2009;Weiss 2010; see also chapter 5 of this volume).…”