The North of the South: The Geopolitical Implications of “Pacific Consensus” in South America and the Brazilian Dilemma

Abstract

This article analyzes the geopolitical implications of the growing economic interdependence between the People's Republic of China and South America, especially Brazil. Presenting data on China's trade and investment and highlighting the advances in diplomatic bilateral cooperation during the 21st century, it focuses on two main questions: Would the China-South America relationship constitute a new pattern of south-south cooperation or a new type of north-south relationship? What role does Brazil play in this scenario? Although China stimulates South American economic growth, what are the geopolitical implications for Brazil, as a regional power, in two specific strategic points: as an industrialized country affected by the competition of Chinese products and as a leader of the South American integration process with The Southern Market (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)? Our hypothesis is that the evolution and dynamics of this relationship are more akin to a center-periphery standard, with special characteristics, which we call Pacific Consensus. A second hypothesis is that, although the growing economic penetration of China in the Southern Hemisphere benefits macroeconomic indicators and economic growth, it challenges the Brazilian strategic geopolitical position, creating a complex dilemma.Este artículo analiza las implicaciones geopolíticas del crecimiento de la interdependencia económica entre la República Popular de China y los países de Sudamérica, especialmente Brasil. El trabajo presenta datos de comercio e inversiones chinas, además resalta los avances en las relaciones diplomáticas entre China y la región durante el siglo XXI, para luego enfocarse en dos cuestiones principales: ¿La relación China-Sudamérica se constituye como un nuevo patrón de cooperación Sur-Sur o como un nuevo tipo de relación Norte-Sur? ¿Cuál es el rol de Brasil en este escenario? A pesar de que China estimula el crecimiento económico de Sudamérica, ¿cuáles son las implicaciones geopolíticas para Brasil, como potencia regional, en dos puntos específicos: como país industrializado perjudicado por las importaciones de productos chinos y como líder del proceso de integración en Sudamérica con el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) y la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR)? Nuestra hipótesis es que la evolución y la dinámica de esta relación se asemejan a un estándar de relación Centro/Periferia con características peculiares que nosotros denominamos Consenso del Pacífico. Una segunda hipótesis destaca que, no obstante la presencia económica de China haya beneficiado los indicadores macroeconómicos y el crecimiento económico en el hemisferio sur, esto desafía la posición geopolítica estratégica de Brasil, creando un dilema complejo.

Two Steps Forward? Assessing Latin American Regionalism Through CELAC

“…The reality is that China is now fully intertwined into regional affairs, especially in economic matters, as illustrated by the over 20‐fold increase in China–Latin American trade in the first decade of the millennium (Hearn, , p. 27). China's policy priorities in Latin America mirror its efforts elsewhere in the developing world; trade and supporting agreements (credit, infrastructure, investment) are means to ensure long‐term, stable access to natural resources like petroleum in Venezuela (Giacalone & Ruiz, ) and copper alloy in Chile (Vadell, , p. 45). This fact poses a challenge to regionalism, given that trade with China and the European Union accounts for more than 50% of all of the region's trade, far exceeding intraregional trade (Malamud & Gardini, , p. 127).…”

“…627–630). China's economic success has provided it with a platform for articulating what has variously been called the Beijing Consensus or the Pacific Consensus (Vadell, , pp. 40–43).…”

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Relações Sino-Brasileiras: Da Horizontalidade No Século Xx Para a Verticalidade No Século Xxi

“…Percebe-se que a atual relação é benéfica para o Brasil, entretanto, em uma perspectiva em longo prazo, expõem maior relevância para a China (VADELL, 2013). A partir dessa visão, é notável que a interação entre esses agentes que estariam em grau de desenvolvimento relativo próximo, nos âmbitos tecnológico e social aproximar-se-ia da perspectiva Sul-Sul de cooperação no século XX.…”

The international implications of the Chinese model of development in the Global South: Asian Consensus as a network power

“…Regarding economic relations between China and Latin American countries, it has been intensified since 2001(Vadell 2007Vadell 2013 Since the Second World War, the relationship between China and Latin America was marked by a strong pragmatism, regardless the political ideology these governments had 8 . The democratic Chilean government of Salvador Allende was the first Latin American country to officially recognize the PRC.…”