my aim in this paper is to offer a systematic analysis of a feature of Kant's theory of perception that tends to be overlooked, viz., his account of how the imagination forms images in perception. although Kant emphasizes the centrality of this feature of perception, indeed, calling it a 'necessary ingredient' of perception, commentators have instead focused primarily on his account of sensibility and intuitions on the one hand, and understanding and concepts on the other. however, I show that careful attention to what he says about the nature of images, their connection to the imagination, and their role in perception in his metaphysics Lectures, as well as in the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the first Critique reveals that Kant is working with a richer, more nuanced framework for perception than is often attributed to him. I contend that it is only once we have a revised framework for Kant's theory of perception in place that we will be able to make further headway in debates, e.g., about whether or not he is a conceptualist about perception. 1. references to Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason are to the section number and a and B pagination of the first and second editions (A/B). all other references are to the section number, volume, and page of Kants gesammelte Schriften.