1976
DOI: 10.1515/kant.1976.67.1-4.156
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The Schematism and Empirical Concepts

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Cited by 32 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…63. although some commentators (Walsh 1957(Walsh /1958Chipman 1972;and Pippin 1976) have argued that a schema is needed to solve the problem of homogeneity only in the transcendental case in which we apply the categories to intuition, given that concepts, in general, are mediate, universal representations and intuitions, in general, are immediate, singular representations, the problem of homogeneity will arise here too. as Kant makes this point in the third Critique, the understanding with its concepts and sensibility with its intuitions are "two heterogeneous elements"; hence, a schema will be needed to mediate between the two in any case in which we apply a concept to an intuition (KU 5:401).…”
Section: Images In the Schematismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…63. although some commentators (Walsh 1957(Walsh /1958Chipman 1972;and Pippin 1976) have argued that a schema is needed to solve the problem of homogeneity only in the transcendental case in which we apply the categories to intuition, given that concepts, in general, are mediate, universal representations and intuitions, in general, are immediate, singular representations, the problem of homogeneity will arise here too. as Kant makes this point in the third Critique, the understanding with its concepts and sensibility with its intuitions are "two heterogeneous elements"; hence, a schema will be needed to mediate between the two in any case in which we apply a concept to an intuition (KU 5:401).…”
Section: Images In the Schematismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I agree with La Rocca (1989: 135) that the act Kant here attributes to the imagination consists in the schematization of the very rule that the concept, for its part, articulates in an intellectual manner. Pippin (1976) takes Kant's alleged identification of empirical concepts and schemata to pose a problem (165-166), arguing that it precludes an account of how exactly empirical concepts are being schematized (171). As I see it, this problem disappears if we take Kant to hold that empirical concepts, like all concepts, are from the outset geared toward the schematic representation of between the concept of a dog and the intuited singular dog.…”
Section: Naked Categories Pure Concepts and Schematamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a lucid introduction to the notion of schematism, see Matherne (). For another standard account see Pippin ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%