The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism

Abstract

What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contrast, when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and there is an explicit legal limit on executive counterterrorism activities, security from terrorism increases. We also show that the executive achieves the objective of terrorism prevention more effectively when there are some limitations on its counterterrorism powers. The article provides a security rationale for legal limits on executive power and has implications for understanding how to design the institutional structure of liberal governments when the social objective is terrorism prevention.

When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects?

“…It has been argued that nonrespect for physical integrity rights could lead to more terrorist activities because the communities from which (potential) terrorists are drawn will be alienated from the rest of society and will, in turn, be less likely to monitor potential terrorists and report suspicious activities to the police. Drawing on game theory, Dragu and Polborn (2014) present a model consisting of an interaction between a representative voter, an elected executive, and members of the community whose support can help prevent terrorist activities. If voters demand tougher counterterrorism policies, governments are likely to supply them because they want to be reelected.…”

Counterterrorism Policies and Attitudes Towards Out-Groups: Evidence from a Survey Experiment on Citizens’ Attitudes Towards Wiretapping

“…The debate involves not only the need for stricter counterterrorist measures (Sunstein 2004;Mueller and Stewart 2012) but also the policy tools that are implemented. There is no consensus regarding which policies are most effective in fighting terror (Mueller and Stewart 2012;Dragu and Polborn 2014;Neumayer et al 2014;Engene 2016). Thus far, the objectives have been to expose potential terrorists and eliminate their organizations.…”

Nordmenns holdninger til telefonavlytting: Resultaterfra et surveyeksperiment

“…Det er ikke gitt at politikernes fokus på tilbudssiden har ført til større sikkerhet for innbyggerne og demokratiet (Sunstein 2004). Det er magert med kunnskap om hvilken politikk som bekjemper terror (Mueller & Stewart 2012;Dragu & Polborn 2014;Neumayer, Plümper & Epifanio 2014;Engene 2016). Dragu og Polborn (ibid.…”