This article is concerned with the democratic quality of network governance in a local context; in particular, the interplay between traditional local government and the emerging network structures. What forms of interplay can be observed between traditional local government and emerging network structures? Of particular interest in this respect is the role of local councillors. As elected representatives, councillors embody the special commitment of authorities towards the public. However, involvement in networks implies a danger of capture, and if network decisions are not open to public scrutiny, democratic control is difficult to achieve even if local councillors are represented. This article therefore discusses networks and accountability: In what ways and to what degree are networks held accountable? Empirically, it explores three local policy networks, all involving the city of Kristiansand. One group of networks -neighbourhood networks -is internally initiated and maintained by the municipality of Kristiansand. Another network is an intermunicipal collaboration involving Kristiansand and five surrounding municipalities. The third network is an example of a public-private partnership that includes the municipality of Kristiansand, as well as several other actors. The case studies show that the actual presence of local government representatives in networks is not enough to ensure accountability. Lines of popular accountability are stretched, either because the networks are deemed irrelevant by the city councillors, or because networks develop decision-making styles that shield them from external political control, or because local councillors deliberately deprive themselves of influence over important policy fields.

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Based on time series data from Norwegian local elections, this article addresses the question of whether the party politicisation process in the local electoral arena is showing signs of reversal. We explore this question by looking at the extent to which non-partisan lists have existed over time in Norwegian municipalities and by an analysis of the degree to which the voters have supported them. Furthermore we examine the nature of the non-partisan lists, and finally we revisit earlier studies that showed that the party politicisation of local government increased participation.The results show that national parties still dominate local politics. Nevertheless, non-partisan lists continue to mobilise. During the 1990s we witnessed a slight rise in the supply of nonpartisan lists. However, supply decreased in the 2003 elections, probably owing to changes in the electoral law. In terms of representation, non-partisan lists appear successful. On average, during the time span we investigate, non-partisan lists obtained mandates in more than 93 percent of the municipalities where they stood for election. Our study gives little support to the assertion that there is a new generation of non-partisan lists consisting mainly of single-issue lists. However, there are signs of a shift away from the traditional local lists. Finally we have analysed the relationship between turnout and the presence of non-partisan lists. In contrast to the 1960s and to some extent the 1970s, turnout is currently highest in municipalities with non-partisan alternatives, irrespective of municipal size. Although it is clearly an overstatement to talk of a non-partisan renaissance, it seems as if the non-partisan lists have a stronger mobilising potential nowadays than they did in the past.

Beginning with the assumed problem of high turnover among local councilors in Norway, the article compares local political recruitment processes in Finland and Norway. Turnover in Norwegian local councils has proven surprisingly stable at 6 M 5 percent for a series of elections, whereas it has been significantly lower at 3545 percent in the other Nordic countries, including Finland. Turnover among Norwegian councilors is mainly due to voluntary retirement. According to theories of political recruitment and representation, lack of motivation among candidates poses a threat to the democratic quality of political systems, because it undermines the voters' ability to exercise democratic control over politicians. The authors argue that rotation in office need not constitute a democratic problem. On the contrary, empirical evidence is presented to show that participation in political council work may in itself have a politically activating effect on the participants. Very few candidacies can be described in terms of political ambition. Instead, motivation is often created and cultivated through participation. Furthermore, rotation in office may lead to the diffusion of political competence and may therefore constitute an alternative source of democratic control.

A number of European countries have witnessed a proliferation of local government enterprises in recent years. Norwegian local councillors are seemingly particularly exposed to this 'enterprise fever'. Our article explores local governments' approaches to the political control of such companies. We observe a reluctance to intervene directly in the affairs of an enterprise, but there is a lastresort preparedness to take more resolute action. Lastly, in contrast to what the prototypical agency model postulates, we find that those who attach strong aspirations of increased capacity to the establishment of companies appear to lack trust in the same companies' performance capability.