The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands

Jong, Abe de; DeJong, Douglas V.; Mertens, Gerard; Wasley, Charles E.

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.01.002

Cited by 141 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…11 The provisions of the Euronext Amsterdam stock exchange in 1997 allow a company to have two of the three takeover defenses (certificates, protective preferred shares and, priority shares) (De Jong et al, 2004a).…”

Section: Shareholders Passivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

Cools

Praag

2007

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Section: Shareholders Passivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The "structuur regime" is viewed as one of the most important anti-takeover defenses (Kabir et al, 1997;Van Oijen, 2000;Van Ees et al, 2003;De Jong et al, 2004a), since the supervisory board is granted the rights previously held by shareholders (see above).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

Cools

Praag

2007

Journal of Corporate Finance

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“…De Jong et al (2004) provide more discussion of this system and its effects on share value. For our study, the implication is that if dividend policy is an effective means of reducing the agency costs of management-ownership separation, then dividends should be particularly important for Dutch shareholders, since they have very little other power to exercise over management.…”

Section: G Agency Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why individual investors want dividends

Dong

Robinson

Veld

2005

Journal of Corporate Finance

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The question of why individual investors want dividends is investigated by submitting a questionnaire to a Dutch investor panel. The respondents indicate that they want dividends partly because the cost of cashing in dividends is lower than the cost of selling shares. Their answers provide strong confirmation for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). They are inconsistent with the uncertainty resolution theory of Gordon (1961Gordon ( , 1962 and the agency theories of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984). The behavioral finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) is not confirmed for cash dividends but is confirmed for stock dividends. Finally, our results indicate that individual investors do not tend to consume a large part of their dividends. This raises some doubt as to whether a reduction or elimination of dividend taxes will stimulate the economy.JEL classification: G30; G35; G38

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“…In accordance with previous studies (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008;Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006;Lang & Stulz, 1994;Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988;Fisher & McGowan, 1983), we employed TOBINSQ as a proxy for firm value in order to capture expected changes in future cash flow. From a review of the literature (Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012;Abel & Eberly, 2011;Eltayeb, 2011;Black et al, 2006;DeJong, Mertens, & Wasley, 2005;Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003;Allayannis & Weston, 2001), this study includes four control variables from a review of the literature to control for the financial condition of a company: ROA, GROWTH, DE, and FC. We expected a positive association between firm value and financial performance with the exception of leverage (DE).…”

Section: Disclosure Of Materials Information and Corporate Social Respmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Nature of Material Information: Disclosure and Its Implications

Wang¹,

Syu²

2015

IJEF

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Understanding the nature of material information is of crucial importance to regulators and the investment community, particularly with regard to the implications of disclosure. This study examined the disclosure of material information by companies listed in Taiwan in various stages of their life cycle to identify the nature of material information as well as related firm performance and provides insights into their causes and consequences. Evidence suggests that companies intent on fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities are more likely to disclose material information and when doing so, they are highly valued by market participants. Our empirical results provide strong evidence that the disclosure of material information by socially responsible companies is associated with higher earnings quality. Furthermore, mature companies are more likely than growing companies to receive favorable reactions from market participants when they disclose material information.

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The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands

Cited by 141 publications

References 41 publications

The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

Why individual investors want dividends

Exploring the Nature of Material Information: Disclosure and Its Implications

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